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INTRODUCTION: A NEW APPROACH TO ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
The principal federal antitrust laws, the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act
of 1914, are broadly worded, and they give the federal courts and antitrust enforcement
agencies wide leeway to develop a federal "common law" of antitrust regulation.' Over
the 115 years since the adoption of the Sherman Act, the courts and enforcement
agencies have altered their interpretation of the antitrust laws to match prevailing
economic assumptions. Two opposing economic theories have battled for dominance
during the modem antitrust era.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the courts and agencies adopted the economic theories of a
group of Harvard scholars who assumed that firms with market power would act in an
anticompetitive manner.2 Under the "Harvard School" approach, the courts and
agencies presumed the illegality of any mergers, joint ventures, or agreements that
allowed firms to obtain, enhance, or exercise market power, regardless of whether the
conduct had the potential to benefit consumers by lowering prices or increasing output.
However, beginning in the late 1970s, the courts and agencies began to adopt the
theories of a group of University of Chicago academics, 3 who taught that the only
legitimate goal of the antitrust laws was to promote consumer welfare.4 Under the
"Chicago School" approach, the courts and agencies became much less willing to
prohibit competitive conduct on its face. Instead, they felt compelled to engage in an
extensive factual inquiry to confirm the effects of particular conduct on consumers
before finding it illegal.
The presumptions of illegality afforded by the Harvard School and the empirical
economic approach of the Chicago School represented opposite poles of antitrust
enforcement. Plaintiffs usually could prevail under a Harvard School approach because
they were excused from proving complex economic facts, while defendants usually
could win under the Chicago School approach because plaintiffs were unable to meet
their burden of proving the adverse economic effects of particular types of conduct.
5
1. Section I of the Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, combination... or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade," 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004); section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal for a
firm to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize" interstate commerce, id. § 2; and section 7 of
the Clayton Act prohibits any mergers the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly," id. § 18. Because of the broad wording of these
statutes, "[p]erhaps uniquely, American antitrust law is a creature of judicial, as opposed to
legislative, creation." Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Visa U.S.A., Inc. et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126
S. Ct. 1276 (2006) (Nos. 04-805 & 04-814).
2. The Harvard scholars included Donald F. Turner and Philip Areeda, who were
influenced by earlier Harvard economists such as Edward Chamberlain, Edward Mason, and Joe
Bain. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization ofAntitrust 116 HARv. L. REV. 917,920 (2003)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001)).
3. The Chicago School scholars included Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and Frank
Easterbrook. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Frank
Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984).
4. See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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As the courts and agencies moved between the divergent approaches of the Chicago
and Harvard Schools, business executives became confused as to the applicable rules
of competitive conduct.
This author argues in a series of articles, published between 1991 and 2001, that
antitrust analysis need not be viewed as a choice between the extremes of the Harvard
and Chicago Schools. Instead of viewing antitrust analysis through either a Harvard or
Chicago School lens, the courts and agencies should adopt a "third way" that builds
upon the insights of both Schools. Neither the Harvard School's presumptions nor the
Chicago School's empiricism are appropriate in all cases. The courts and agencies
should construe antitrust analysis as a continuum, under which they can vary their
degree of inquiry depending upon the likely competitive effects of the particular
conduct at issue.
6
In 1999, in California Dental Ass "n v. FTC,7 the United States Supreme Court,
citing the work of this author and other antitrust commentators, endorsed a similar type
of analysis. California Dental made it clear that antitrust analysis should be conducted
under a sliding scale, allowing for different levels of scrutiny depending upon the type
of restraint at issue. 8 However, California Dental did not explain how to apply its
sliding scale analysis to specific types of competitive conduct, and the lower federal
courts have not yet been able to use California Dental to reconcile the antitrust divide
between the Harvard and Chicago Schools.9
This Article sets forth a comprehensive means of analyzing all types of competitive
conduct in a manner consistent with California Dental. The proposed approach would
6. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A ProposedAntitrust Approach to Collaborations Among
Competitors, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1137 (2001) [hereinafter Piraino, Jr., Antitrust Approach to
Collaborations]; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard
for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753 (1994); [hereinafter Piraino, Jr., Rule
of Reason]; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to
Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685 (1991) [hereinafter Piraino, Jr., Reconciling].
7. 526 U.S. 759 (1999). California Dental has been called a "major antitrust event" and
may constitute a watershed in the Court's approach to antitrust analysis. See Charles P. Weller,
A "New" Rule of Reason from Justice Brandeis' "Concentric Circles " and Other Changes in
Law, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 881, 949 (1999).
8. California Dental, 526 U.S. at 780 (citing PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1507
(1986); William Kolasky, Counterpoint: The Department of Justice's "'Stepwise" Approach
Imposes Too Heavy a Burden on Parties to Horizontal Agreements, ANTTrRusT, Spring 1998, at
41, 43; Piraino, Jr., Rule of Reason, supra note 6, at 1771).
9. The divide between the Harvard and Chicago approaches was evident in the differing
reactions to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Trinko,
540 U.S. 398 (2004), which found that a monopoly telephone company should not be liable for
refusing to allow access to its telephone network. A prominent follower of the Chicago School
applauded the Court's conclusion that fact finders are ill-equipped to regulate access to
monopolists' facilities, see John Thome, A Categorical Rule Limiting Section 2 of the Sherman
Act: Verizon v. Trinko, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 289, 296 (2005), while a strong Harvard School
supporter called the decision a "child in a china shop of Section 2" which elevated "business
freedom" above the interests of "competition and competitive opportunity." Eleanor M. Fox,
The Trouble with Trinko, 52 ANNUAL SPRING MEETING OF THE ANTITRUST SECTION OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: GENERAL SESSION PROGRAM COURSE MATERIALS 1365, 1369-70
(2004).
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resolve the conflicts between the Harvard and Chicago Schools and establish a more
balanced theory of antitrust regulation. By adopting this unified approach, the courts
and agencies can avoid their confusing swing between the extremes of the Harvard and
Chicago Schools. The new approach proposed in this Article will encourage American
firms to engage in aggressive competitive conduct beneficial to consumers, while
deterring firms from behavior that harms consumers. The approach should also
conserve judicial resources and give business executives and practitioners better notice
of the types of competitive conduct that will be permitted or precluded.
I. THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF ANTITRUST
Antitrust analysis is now poised at a critical tipping point between the Harvard and
Chicago Schools. Neither approach has proven to be effective in regulating
competitive conduct. The Harvard School prohibited innovative forms of competition
that could have enhanced economic efficiency, while the Chicago School allowed
competitors to engage in certain conduct that harmed consumers in many domestic
markets. The courts and agencies need to move beyond these two theories and adopt a
new approach to antitrust analysis tailored to the competitive landscape of the twenty-
first century.
The Harvard School dominated antitrust analysis during the activist era of antitrust
enforcement that extended from the middle of the twentieth century to the 1970s. By
the late 1980s, however, the Chicago School revolutionized the approach to antitrust in
the federal courts and enforcement agencies. Under the Chicago School's hegemony,
the courts and agencies now must engage in an empirical analysis of actual competitive
effects before ruling on the legality of specific competitive conduct.
A. The Harvard School
In the middle of the twentieth century, Harvard economists such as Edward
Chamberlain,' 0 Edward Mason, and Joe Bain 12 argued that an industry's structure,
that is, the number of firms in the market and their relative sizes, determines how
effectively firms will perform in that market.' 3 Beginning in the 1960s, Harvard
professors applied the structural approach of the Harvard economists to antitrust
10. See EDWARD CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933).
11. See EDWARD S. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM
(1964).
12. See JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1959); JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO
NEW CoMPETmoN: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
(1956).
13. The Harvard economists were heavily influenced by the classic theory of structuralism
set forth by Augustin Cournot in 1838. AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE
MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Macmillan
Publishers 1897) (1838). Cournot hypothesized that oligopolists would calculate their output so
that, together, they would be able to achieve a profit-maximizing price approaching the
monopoly level. John E. Lopatka, Solving the Monopoly Problem: Turner's Try, 41 ANTITRUST
BULL. 843, 862 (1996). For a current theory of structuralism, see F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1990).
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theory. These scholars argued that, when markets are concentrated, firms are more
likely to engage in anticompetitive conduct.14 Harvard School academics pointed out
that, when Congress enacted the Sherman and Clayton Acts, it was concerned with the
growing economic and political power of trusts such as the Standard Oil Company and
United States Steel Corporation. In construing the broad language of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, the courts should be guided by Congress's desire to protect individual
competitors from the market power wielded by large firms.15
Harvard scholars opposed market concentration, even when it might lower costs and
prices, thereby benefiting consumers. 16 Harvard scholarship convinced manyjudges to
presume the illegality of any conduct by firms with market power, regardless of its
effect on consumers. For example, in 1945, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America,' 7 Judge Learned Hand found Alcoa liable for monopolizing the aluminum
manufacturing market.18 Taking advantage of economies of scale by expanding its
manufacturing capacity to meet increasing demand, Alcoa was able to deliver quality
products to customers at low prices. 19 Judge Hand's decision penalized Alcoa simply
for engaging in aggressive competition that benefitted consumers.
The Harvard School approach had a similar effect in deterring consumer-friendly
mergers. In 1963, the government persuaded the Supreme Court to preclude a merger
between two banks in the Philadelphia area that together held only thirty percent of the
relevant market. The Court deemed irrelevant the defendants' arguments that the
merger might have enhanced their ability to provide better services to their
Philadelphia customers.
20
The Harvard School approach had many advantages. If antitrust analysis under the
Harvard School was not perfect, at least it was certain. The courts were able to indulge
in a presumption of illegality for many types of conduct without engaging in a
complicated analysis of the economic circumstances in the relevant market. Since the
14. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 920 ("[T]he Harvard School historically tend[ed] to
emphasize a strong relationship between structure and performance .. ").
15. See Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins ofAntitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective, 5
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 73, 74-76 (1985) (arguing that the Sherman Act was designed to transfer
wealth from big business to small merchants and farmers); Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive
Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1982) (stating that Congress
was concerned with distributing economic and political power more widely); David Millon, The
Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1287-92 (1988) (viewing the
original purpose of the Sherman Act as the protection of democratic institutions from
concentrated economic power).
16. For example, Donald Turner argued in a 1962 article in the Harvard Law Review that,
since concentrated markets were so inefficient, Congress should pass legislation allowing the
courts to dismember large firms, despite their ability to achieve economies of scale and lower
producers' costs. Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655, 663-73 (1962).
17. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
18. Id.
19. Donald I. Baker, Government Enforcement of Section 2,61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 898,
905 (1986).
20. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) ("[A] merger the
effect of which 'may be substantially to lessen competition' is not saved because, on some
ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.").
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outcomes of trials were so predictable, business executives understood the type of
conduct they should avoid. Firms in concentrated industries were effectively deterred
from transactions that increased concentration levels in the relevant market. The
Harvard School approach, however, also had serious disadvantages. Harvard School
jurists were too quick to find fault with aggressive competition. The courts and
agencies prevented large firms from engaging in competitive conduct that could have
benefited consumers and would have been perfectly permissible for firms with lower
market shares.
B. The Chicago School
By the late 1960s, a group of scholars at the University of Chicago had set forth an
opposing theory of antitrust analysis in a series of articles and treatises. These scholars
found no evidence that Congress's intent under the antitrust laws was to protect
individual competitors against large firms' exercise of market power. In a 1966 law
review article, Robert Bork argued that the antitrust laws were designed simply to
increase the efficiency of the American economy.21 Bork defined economic efficiency
in terms of conditions that maximized wealth, and he equated wealth enhancement with
"consumer welfare," meaning lower costs, reduced prices, and increased output of
products and services desired by customers. 22 Bork believed that "[t]he only legitimate
goal of American antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare." 23 All other
possible goals of the antitrust laws, including the protection of small business from the
power of large firms, were irrelevant.24
Chicago School academics argued that the Harvard School misjudged the ways in
which firms continue to compete, even when they have relatively few rivals.25 Chicago
School scholars believed that markets were likely to correct against any competitive
imbalances on their own, without intervention by antitrust regulators.26 Indeed, the
courts and government agencies usually made poor decisions in attempting to regulate
economic conduct; they were simply not capable of devising regulatory solutions that
were more effective than the natural workings of the marketplace. Since markets are
self-correcting in any event, the courts and enforcement agencies should only intervene
in the competitive process when it was clear, after thorough study, that anticompetitive
conduct was threatening consumer welfare.
27
21. See Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7
(1966).
22. Id.
23. BORK, supra note 3, at 51; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antirust Policy, 84
MICH. L. REv. 1696, 1703 (1986) ("However you slice the legislative history, the dominant
theme is the protection of consumers from overcharges.").
24. Bork, supra note 2 1, at 7.
25. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 921 (stating that the Chicago School assumes that
"[e]ven in concentrated markets, firms will naturally try to find ways of competing with each
other").
26. The Chicago School scholars asserted that markets should be given a free rein because
the greatest good comes from "the natural tendency of firms... to be efficient." Eleanor Fox,
The Battle for the Soul ofAntitrust, 75 CAL. L. REv. 917, 917 (1987).
27. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Reviev and Critique, 2001 COLUM.
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The Chicago School began to impact antitrust case law in the late 1970s, when
several Chicago School scholars, including Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, and
Richard Posner, were appointed to the federal bench.28 By the early 1990s, the Chicago
School had completed a revolution in antitrust analysis. No longer willing to indulge a
presumption of illegality for many types of competitive conduct, the courts and
agencies insisted on proof of specific anticompetitive effects before finding
defendants' conduct illegal. It was insufficient for a plaintiffto prove that an individual
firm or a group of competitors possessed significant market power. In addition,
plaintiffs would have to demonstrate, through empirical evidence, that the conduct at
issue harmed consumers by increasing prices or decreasing output.
This approach led the courts and agencies to become more lenient in allowing firms
to acquire and exercise market power. In 1979, the Supreme Court refused to presume
the illegality of a price-fixing agreement among a group of musical composers;29 in
1997, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) permitted the Boeing Company to acquire
the McDonnell Douglas Corporation in a transaction that gave Boeing and Airbus a
duopoly in the worldwide market for the manufacture of commercial airliners;30 and in
2002, the Bush Administration settled the Department of Justice's long-standing
monopolization case against Microsoft by consenting to a final judgment that allowed
the company to continue to leverage its monopoly in the computer operating system
market into related markets for word processing, Internet access, video and audio
services, and instant messaging.
31
Ultimately, the Chicago School overreacted to the shortcomings of the Harvard
School, and in so doing created its own problems. Chicago School adherents never
acknowledged an inherent conflict in their approach to antitrust regulation. Chicago
School economists believed that the courts and agencies were ineffective in regulating
competitive conduct. 32 Yet in denying the presumptions of illegality used by the
Harvard School, the Chicago School left judges, juries, and administrative agencies
with even more responsibility in antitrust cases. Henceforth, fact finders would have to
confirm the specific economic effects of competitive conduct on consumers. Such
decisions ultimately proved to be beyond the competence ofjudicial and administrative
fact finders. Most judges, juries, and government regulators are simply not capable of
deciding complex economic issues. Indeed, even economists disagree about how such
decisions should be made. 33 If such decision making is difficult for economists, it is
Bus. L. REV. 257, 269 ("Chicago School antitrust writers developed well-reasoned arguments
that in the long run markets tend to correct their own imperfections... and that tribunals would
be well advised to study practices much more thoroughly before deciding that intervention is
appropriate.").
28. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Bork, J.); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.);
Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
29. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (refusing to apply the per se rule to
agreement by musical composers to license their copyrighted compositions at identical prices).
30. See In re Boeing Co., [1997-2001 FTC Complaints & Orders Transfer Binder] Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,295 (July 1, 1997).
31. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology
Competition, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 119-23 (2002) [hereinafter Piraino, Jr., High
Technology Competition] (describing deficiencies in Microsoft Final Judgment).
32. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
33. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 153 ("If you assembled [twelve] economists and gave
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almost impossible for lay juries, administrators, and judges who are not trained in
economics.
34
By the late 1980s, the Chicago School had destroyed the old antitrust verities. No
longer could business executives be sure of the types of transactions that might lead to
antitrust liability. Faced with the impossibility of making the empirical economic
decisions required by the Chicago School, fact finders rendered a series of conflicting
decisions in antitrust cases. These decisions confused antitrust practitioners and
business executives as to the applicable standards of conduct under the antitrust laws.
As a result, the antitrust laws lost their deterrent effect. Firms miscalculated by
engaging in harmful conduct whose illegality would have been clear under the Harvard
School approach.3
II. THE PRINCIPAL CASES REFLECTING THE HARVARD/CHICAGO SCHOOL CONFLICT
The next three Parts describe how the Harvard/Chicago School conflict has played
out in the courts' and agencies' approach to the most significant antitrust issues of the
last forty years: restraints of trade, mergers andjoint ventures, and monopoly conduct.
As the Chicago School has triumphed over the Harvard School approach in each of
those areas, the courts' and agencies' analysis of competitive conduct has inevitably
become more complex, antitrust decisions have become more confusing, and business
executives have found it increasingly difficult to understand how to tailor their conduct
to comply with the antitrust laws.
A. The Restraint of Trade Cases
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any "conspiracy, in restraint oftrade."36 For
most of the twentieth century, the federal courts have assumed that they must choose
between two opposite methods of analyzing restraints of trade under section 1: a "per
se rule" that deems certain conduct illegal on its face;37 or a "rule of reason" that
them all available data about a business practice, plus an unlimited computer budget, you would
not soon (or ever) get unanimous agreement about whether the practice promoted consumers'
welfare or economic efficiency more broadly defined.").
34. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) ("Judges often
lack the expert understanding of industrial market structures and behavior to determine with any
confidence a practice's effect on competition."); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596,
609-12 (1972) ("[Clourts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems....
[They are] ill-equipped for such decision making [and cannot] analyze, interpret, and evaluate
the myriad of competing interests and the endless data that would surely be brought to bear on
such decisions."). As Professor Sullivan has concluded, "economics does not comprehend
enough and law, without extreme transformations in its own structure, cannot adequately deal
with all that economics does comprehend." LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST § 2, at 10 (1977).
35. See Piraino, Jr., Reconciling, supra note 6, at 709 ("[D]efendants continue to engage in
questionable competitive practices.").
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
37. The per se rule constitutes an irrebutable presumption of illegality. Herbert Hovenkamp
has concluded that the conduct is considered per se illegal "because no one has made a plausible
argument that the action is competitive, and its anticompetitive potential seems fairly obvious."
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution, and the Marketfor Exclusionary
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inquires into all conceivable circumstances before determining the legality of a
particular restraint. 38 The per se and rule of reason approaches are so divergent that a
court's choice of one analysis over another has usually determined the outcome of an
antitrust case. Traditionally, the rule of reason meant a decision for the defendant and
the per se rule a victory for the plaintiff.39 Because the dividing line between per se and
rule of reason analysis is so critical, a debate has raged for decades over the proper
scope of each approach. The Harvard and Chicago Schools have been aligned on
opposite sides of the per se/rule of reason divide.
1. Ascendancy of the Per Se Rule
Courts and agencies following the Harvard School found a per se approach
attractive because it greatly enhanced the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement. Per se
standards reduced the time and expense of antitrust cases, provided clear guidance to
businesses, and effectively deterred anticompetitive conduct.40 The Supreme Court first
used a per se approach early in the twentieth century in price-fixing cases, where the
anticompetitive potential of the arrangements was so obvious that the Court could
easily dispense with inquiries into market conditions or the defendants' justifications.41
No new per se classifications were established until the late 1950s, when the
Harvard School first began to influence the Supreme Court. By the late 1960s, the
Court had applied the per se rule to tying arrangements, 42 horizontal territorial or
Rights, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1293, 1294-95 n.8 (1987).
38. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (listing several
factors a court should consider before invoking antitrust sanctions). In Continental T. V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that "[u]nder this rule [of reason], the factfinder
weighs all the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)
(citing Chicago Bd of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238).
39. Donald L. Beschle, "What Never? Well, Hardly Ever": Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an
Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 501-02 (1987); Joe Sims,
Developments in Agreements Among Competitors, 58 ANTITRUSTL.J. 433,435 (1989). The rule
of reason has been viewed as "a euphemism for an endless economic inquiry ending in a defense
verdict." Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for
the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 337 (2000) (quoting Maxwell M. Blecher, The
Schwinn Case-An Example of a Genuine Commitment to Antitrust Law, 44 ANTITRUST L.J.
550, 553 (1975)). Indeed, plaintiffs have so rarely prevailed in rule of reason cases that the
approach has been equated with a rule of per se legality. See William F. Baxter, The Viability of
Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REv. 933, 949 (1987) ("As a practical matter, current
case law treats all... [nonprice] vertical restraints as lawful per se [under the rule of reason].").
40. The courts have concluded that the litigation efficiencies provided by the per se rule
justify its occasional overbreadth. For example, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,
457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982), the Supreme Court stated: "As in every rule of general application,
the match between the presumed and the actual is imperfect. For the sake of business certainty
and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a fullblown
inquiry might have proved to be reasonable."
41. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (horizontal price
fixing); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (horizontal price fixing);
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (resale price fixing).
42. See N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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customer allocations, 43 and group boycotts. 44 The Harvard School "fever reached its
peak''45 in 1967 with United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 46 which extended the per
se rule to nonprice vertical restrictions imposed by a supplier on its distributors.
By making so many restraints illegal on their face, the activist per se approach
insured that American firms would avoid conduct that could harm consumers.47 The
dominance of the per se rule, however, also caused significant problems. The per se
approach was rigid and formalistic. By mechanically precluding certain conduct
without any consideration of its economic effects, the rule deterred beneficial, as well
as pernicious, business practices. For example, the nonprice vertical restraints
condemned by the Supreme Court in Schwinn arguably promoted competition between
retail brands.4a During the 1970s, Chicago School scholars began to criticize the per se
rule for its failure to consider the potential beneficial effects of such restraints.4 9
2. Increased Use of the Rule of Reason
After the high watermark of per se analysis in the Schwinn case, the federal
judiciary began to take notice of the Chicago School's criticism of the approach. The
most dramatic retreat from per se analysis occurred in 1977 when, in Continental T. V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,50 the Supreme Court reversed its decision in Schwinn and
decided that nonprice vertical restrictions should be judged by the rule of reason.
At issue in Sylvania was a contractual requirement that distributors sell Sylvania
television sets only from authorized locations. 51 The Court recognized that, although
this requirement limited competition among the distributors in the resale of Sylvania
televisions ("intrabrand competition"), it also promoted competition with other brands
of television sets ("interbrand competition") by inducing Sylvania distributors to make
the investments necessary to provide more services to customers. 52 Drawing heavily
upon the scholarship of Richard Posner, 53 the Court concluded that a rule of reason,
43. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc.,
388 U.S. 350 (1967).
44. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
45. Earl L. Pollock, The "New Antitrust"--Its Implications for the Practitioner, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 51, 52 (1985).
46. 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977).
47. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 609 n. 10 ("Without theper se rules, businessmen would be left
with little to aid them in predicting in any particular case what courts will find to be legal and
illegal urder the Sherman Act.").
48. Sfe Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLuM. L.
REv. 282, 297 (1975) (noting that Schwinn's application of the per se rule to vertical restraints
prevents the consideration of beneficial effects on interbrand competition, such as improved
point-of-sale services).
49. See, e.g., id. (criticizing application of per se rule to resale restraints).
50. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
51. Id. at40-41.
52. Id. at 54-55.
53. Id. at 36, 50-57 (citing RicHARD A. PosNER, ANTrrRusT: CASES, EcoNoMic NOTES, AND
OTHER MATERIALS 134 (1974); Posner, supra note 48, at 283, 285, 287-88).
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rather than a per se, approach was appropriate in light of the potential economic
benefits of the location clause imposed by Sylvania. 4
Sylvania established the foundation for modem antitrust's reliance on empirical
economic evidence. After Sylvania, the federal courts had to confront a new paradigm:
henceforth, they could not indulge in any presumptions of illegality under the antitrust
laws that were not supported by economic facts. Other decisions favoring the rule of
reason followed on the heels of Sylvania. Indeed, the history of antitrust analysis since
Sylvania has been, with only a few exceptions, a steady erosion of the per se approach
and an expanded use of the rule of reason.
In 1979 the Supreme Court indicated for the first time that it would be willing to
apply a rule of reason analysis to a price-fixing arrangement. The Court held in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS55 ("BM/") that a group of copyright holders did not
commit a per se violation of the Sherman Act when they fixed a common price for the
licensing of their musical compositions. 56 The Court pointed out that, instead of
engaging in a rigid per se analysis, fact finders should initially consider whether a
restraint "appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output. ' 57 The Court concluded that the common license
allowed the copyright holders to market their compositions more efficiently and
therefore should be analyzed under the rule of reason.
58
During the 1980s, the Supreme Court extended the rule of reason to other horizontal
agreements with potential efficiency justifications. 59 The lower federal courts have
followed the Supreme Court's lead in limiting applications of the per se rule and
expanding the use of the rule of reason. Convinced by the Chicago School of the
dangers of an absolute approach, federal judges have shown an increased willingness
to consider defendants' justifications for practices formerly considered illegal on their
face.6 °
3. Deficiencies in Rule of Reason Analysis
As a result of the revolution in antitrust economics that occurred within the federal
judiciary in the 1980s, the rule of reason is now the dominant form of analysis in
Sherman Act cases. However, the Chicago School has been unable to construct a
54. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-57.
55. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
56. Id. at 24-25.
57. Id. at 19-20.
58. Id. at 20.
59. See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (using the rule of reason to
analyze refusal by an association of dentists to supply patient x-rays to insurance companies
seeking to evaluate benefit claims); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (using the rule
of reason to analyze the NCAA's limitations on the number of times its member college sports
teams could appear on television).
60. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (allowing requirement that van lines not deal with other moving companies); Nat'l
Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (1 th Cir. 1986) (upholding interchange fee
among members of Visa credit card system); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185
(7th Cir. 1985) (upholding noncompetition covenant).
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formulation of the rule of reason that allows for effective decision making, Most
judicial discussion of the rule of reason standard has occurred in the Supreme Court
and federal appellate courts, where the analysis has been confined to the issue of
whether a rule of reason or per se standard should apply.61 Once the courts have
decided that the rule of reason is appropriate, they have usually neglected to explain
how it should be applied on remand. Most courts' definitions of the rule have not
progressed beyond a requirement that the trier of fact consider all the circumstances
surrounding a restraint before condemning it.62 The courts simply quote "a long list of
factors without any indication of priority or weight to be accorded each factor.,
63
The current rule of reason standard provides little guidance to litigants, judges, or
juries.64 Antitrust enforcement relies primarily on self-policing by the business
community, but voluntary compliance is impossible when antitrust standards are
unclear. These uncertain standards can lead both to under-deterrence and over-
deterrence. Not only will firms miscalculate and risk anticompetitive conduct that they
believe to be lawful; they may also avoid procompetitive behavior under the mistaken
assumption that it can be attacked successfully. 65 Since the outcome of cases is so
difficult to predict, both plaintiffs and defendants miscalculate. Plaintiffs bring
unjustified suits that waste judicial and private resources, and defendants continue to
engage in questionable competitive practices. Under the courts' current approach, the
antitrust laws are capable of neither encouraging beneficial conduct nor deterring
anticompetitive practices. In order to insure an effective antitrust policy, the federal
courts must adopt a clearer method of analyzing restraints of trade under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.
B. Merger and Joint Venture Cases
Mergers andjoint ventures are evaluated under section 7 of the Clayton Act, which
prohibits any such transactions that may "substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly."66 Until the mid- 1 970s, the federal courts and agencies followed a
Harvard School approach to mergers and joint ventures. This approach caused the
courts and agencies to presume illegality of any mergers or joint ventures among firms
that held substantial shares of the relevant market. Currently, however, the courts and
agencies follow a Chicago School approach that allows them to consider factors other
61. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
62. Mark Crane, The Future Direction of Antitrust, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 14 (1987).
63. Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical
Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 34 (1978).
64. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1984)
("When everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive. Any one factor might or might not
outweigh another, or all of the others, in the factfinder's contemplation. The formulation offers
no help to businesses planning their conduct.").
65. Id.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2002). Because the parties to the joint venture retain their independent
existence and continue to compete with each other outside the scope of the venture, joint
ventures may also be evaluated under the "restraint of trade" provisions of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
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than the parties' market shares before determining the legality of a merger or joint
venture.
1. The Harvard School Approach
Harvard School scholars believed that mergers and joint ventures which
substantially increased concentration levels in the relevant market made it easier for the
remaining firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct.67 Either the merged entity acting
alone (defined as "unilateral effects") or the merged entity collaborating with the
remaining firms in the market (defined as "coordinated effects") could limit
competition by charging higher prices, lowering output, reducing product quality, or
slowing innovation. 68 Under the Harvard School approach, the courts and enforcement
agencies defined a relevant market, assigned market shares to each of the competitors
in the market, and presumed the illegality of transactions that increased market
concentration levels beyond particular thresholds. As the Supreme Court noted,
"market definition generally determine[d] the result of the case." 69
Under the Harvard School approach, the courts and agencies applied the market
share presumption of illegality regardless of whether the transaction at issue had the
potential to lower costs or prices or otherwise benefit consumers. For example, in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,70 the Supreme Court considered the legality of a
merger between two shoe manufacturers. The Court conceded that the merger would
allow the integrated companies to "market their own brands at prices below those of
competing independent retailers."'', Despite this advantage to consumers, the Court
67. The Harvard School antitrust treatise supported prima facie illegality for mergers in
which the parties had an aggregate share of thirteen to fourteen percent of the relevant market.
See 4 PHiLLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 915, at 83 (1980).
68. For a unilateral effects case, see United States v. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp.
968, 975 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacatedas moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997), stating that "courts
have focused on whether the merger will cause the merged entity to have enough market power
such that it could profitably increase prices." For a coordinated effects case, see Hospital Corp.
of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986), stating that "the worry is that [the
merger] may enable the acquiring firm to cooperate (or cooperate better) with other leading
competitors on reducing or limiting output, thereby pushing up the market price."
69. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n.15 (1992). The
Supreme Court has followed this highly structured approach to the analysis of mergers since the
early 1960s. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963)
(establishing the principle that the illegality of a merger can be presumed from a substantial
market share concentration level); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 335 (1962)
("[Tihe proper definition of the market is a 'necessary predicate' to an examination of the
competition that may be affected by the... merger."). Beginning in 1968, the U. S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC published guidelines for merger enforcement that followed the
Supreme Court's lead and adopted presumptions of illegality based on the market shares of the
parties to a merger. Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,101-103 (Mar. 18,
1968). The most recent guidelines ("Merger Guidelines"), issued by the DOJ and FTC in 1992,
establish a formula called the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to calculate the specific
market share concentration levels at which mergers should be presumed illegal.
70. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
71. Id. at 344.
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invalidated the merger, pointing out that it was more important to promote Congress's
objective of protecting small business against potential abuses of power by larger
firms: "[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress'[s] desire to promote competition
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated
that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of
fragmented industries and markets. 72
2. The Chicago School Approach
By the mid-1970s, Chicago School scholars began to criticize the federal courts'
market share presumption of illegality for mergers and joint ventures. The
presumption, these scholars asserted, precluded many efficiency-enhancing
transactions.73
Responding to the concerns of the Chicago School, the Supreme Court, in the mid-
1970s, began to open up merger and joint venture analysis to a consideration of factors
other than market share concentration statistics. In 1974, in United States v. General
Dynamics Corp.,74 the Court, in a marked departure from its earlier antitrust
jurisprudence, held that a merger could not be deemed illegal simply because the
defendants held high market shares. The Court expressed a willingness to consider
conditions that might affect the future market shares of the merging parties.75 General
Dynamics paved the way to a more sophisticated approach to merger and joint venture
analysis. After General Dynamics, the courts and agencies became willing to consider
defendants' arguments that their current market shares inaccurately predicted a
transaction's probable effect on future competition. 6
In a few recent cases, the courts and agencies have relied on General Dynamics to
discount the future market share of financially troubled companies.7 7 As the District of
72. Id. See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,318-19 (1949) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (showing concern for "growth in bigness").
73. For example, Richard Posner argued that there was no basis for automatic judicial
intervention against a merger where the combined market share of the four largest firms in the
market was less than sixty percent. POSNER, supra note 3, at 112.
74. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
75. General Dynamics involved a merger between two coal companies. The Court pointed
out that most of the coal companies' production was committed under long-term supply
contracts. Id. at 501-02. The defendants' past market shares did "not... necessarily give a
proper picture of [their] future ability to compete" because other companies with large supplies
of coal not already under contract would likely be able to obtain a greater market share in future
negotiations. Id. at 501.
76. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 69, at 20,573-76 ("Market share concentration data
provide only the starting point for analyzing the competitive impact of a merger. Before
determining whether to challenge a merger, the Agency also will assess the other market factors
that pertain to competitive effects, as well as entry, efficiencies and failure.").
77. See United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769, 773-75 (7th Cir. 1977)
(allowing merger between International Harvester and tractor manufacturer on grounds that
manufacturer would not have sufficient financial resources to compete effectively in future); In
re Boeing Co., [ 1997-2001 FTC Complaints & Orders Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
24,295, at 24,123-24 (July 1, 1997) (allowing merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas on
grounds that, due to its financial distress, McDonnell Douglas would "no longer constitute a
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Columbia Circuit recognized in United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc. ,'78 "evidence of
market concentration simply provides a convenient starting point for a broader inquiry
into future competitiveness.'
79
Despite the courts' and agencies' willingness to consider economic factors that may
reduce merging parties' future market shares, the Chicago School has not been able to
convince antitrust regulators to fully recognize economic efficiencies as a mitigating
factor in merger cases. Economists have recognized that mergers may achieve
economies of scale, synergies, or cost savings that will allow the parties to offer lower
prices to consumers after the completion of the transaction. The courts and agencies,
however, have not yet been willing to consider such efficiencies as a defense to an
otherwise illegal merger."0 Some commentators have ascribed the courts' and agencies'
reluctance to recognize an efficiencies defense to the difficulty of confirming the
legitimacy of defendants' efficiency claims.8'
C. Monopoly Cases
Under the Harvard School approach, the courts and agencies were willing to
preclude rather benign conduct by firms that were only attempting to obtain or
maintain a monopoly position in the relevant market. However, as the courts and
agencies began to adopt the empirical approach of the Chicago School, they
recognized that firms should not be punished simply for obtaining monopoly power.
Indeed, firms often obtained such power because they were the most successful in
delivering the types of products and services desired by consumers. Thus, under the
Chicago School, the courts and agencies became unwilling to find monopolists liable
meaningful competitive force" in the relevant market). See also FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938
F.2d 1206, 1221 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e view General Dynamics as standing for the
unremarkable proposition that a defendant may rebut the government's prima facie case by
showing that the government's market share statistics overstate the acquired firm's ability to
compete in the future .... ).
78. 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
79. Id. at 984.
80. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to recognize an efficiencies defense for
mergers that substantially increase concentration levels in a relevant market. See FTC v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (stating that "possible economies cannot be used as a
defense to illegality" in section 7 merger cases); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 371 (1963) ("[A] merger the effect of which 'may be substantially to lessen
competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and
credits, it may be deemed beneficial."). For their part, the lower federal courts have never found
that efficiencies should save a merger that otherwise would have been deemed anticompetitive.
See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing the history of the
efficiencies defense). The Merger Guidelines of the FTC and DOJ have provided for an
efficiencies defense since 1997, Merger Guidelines, supra note 69, 13,104, at 20,573-11 to-13,
but the provision has not caused the agencies to recognize an efficiencies defense in their
enforcement actions. See David Balto, The Efficiency Defense in Merger Review: Progress or
Stagnation?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 74, 79 (describing the FTC's neglect of efficiency
issues).
81. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Policy in a Clinton Administration, 62 ANTITRUST
L.J. 217, 221 (1993).
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under the Sherman Act unless they had engaged in some type of improper competitive
conduct.
1. The Harvard School Approach
Section 2 of the Sherman Act precludes monopolization, or attempts to monopolize,
by individual firms.8 2 Harvard School scholars have assumed that poor economic
performance is inevitable in monopoly markets.83 Until the late 1960s, the federal
courts and enforcement agencies followed a Harvard School approach in section 2
cases, and they became willing to find monopolists liable, even if they had not engaged
in any exclusionary behavior.
84
Once a defendant was found to possess monopoly power, the courts and agencies
precluded any conduct having the purpose or effect of protecting or increasing that
power. "It was sufficient that a defendant evidenced a general intent to obtain or
maintain its monopoly power, [that is], that it chose to do the acts that led to the
establishment or perpetuation of its monopoly."8 5 Commentators have pointed out that
such a standard "is hardly a requirement at all ... It is almost inconceivable that [a
monopolist] can possess [monopoly] power... without taking some volitional act that
may fairly be characterized as an exercise of its power.,
8 6
2. The Chicago School Approach
Chicago School scholars believe that monopolists should not be liable simply for
engaging in conduct that is a natural consequence of their market power. The Chicago
School assumes that firms usually acquire monopoly power because of their ability to
provide consumers with superior products at low prices. Punishing monopolists simply
82. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
83. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
84. The 1978 version of the Harvard antitrust treatise argued that monopolies should be
dismembered, even if they had not engaged in identifiable anticompetitive conduct. See 3
PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 620c, at 45-47 (1978).
85. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists 'Illegal Conduct Under the Sherman
Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 809, 829 (2000) [hereinafter Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists].
86. Maxwell M. Blecher & Consuelo S. Woodhead, Bigness and Badness: A Review of the
Requirement of "Deliberateness" in Monopolization, 10 Sw. U. L. REv. 117, 119(1978). In the
1945 case United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica ("Alcoa"), Judge Hand found that Alcoa
illegally used its monopoly power simply by expanding its aluminum production capacity to
meet increasing consumer demand. 148 F.2d 416,431 (2d Cir. 1945); See Baker, supra note 19,
at 905-06 ("Alcoa seemed to have done what we ask of a competitor in a competitive market-
keep prices and profits down, stimulate demand, and be there ready to meet that demand on
reasonable terms."); John G. McGee, Why Not "Deregulation "for Antitrust?, 46 ANTITRUST L.
J. 777, 786 (1977) ("[A]ny superior firm trying to drive price down to, or closer to, its own cost,
runs head-on into Alcoa ...."). Other cases followed Alcoa's lead in finding the requisite
anticompetitive conduct from a monopolist's general intent to maintain its position in a market.
See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 344 U.S. 100 (1947) (finding section 2 violation when
motion picture distributors pooled their buying power to obtain lower rates in their royalty
agreements with motion picture producers).
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for exercising their market power would discourage firms from competing aggressively
to meet consumers' needs.
8 7
The Supreme Court began to take a more lenient Chicago School approach to
monopoly conduct in the late 1960s, in the case of United States v. Grinnell Corp.
88
Grinnell, a manufacturer of central station alarm services, had acquired many of its
major competitors and had engaged in a series of geographic and product market
allocation agreements.8 9 The Supreme Court found little difficulty in inferring a section
2 violation from such conduct. 9° However, in dicta, the Court set forth a standard that
would be used extensively by defendants to avoid liability in later cases. The Court
stated that section 2 should only prohibit "the willful acquisition or maintenance of...
[monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historical accident."91 After Grinnell, the courts
struggled to develop objective standards for determining whether monopoly power
resulted from improper willful conduct or from aggressive competition that benefited
consumers.
As in restraint of trade, merger, and joint venture cases, the courts' and agencies'
decisions in post-Harvard School monopoly cases have failed to provide effective
guidelines for business conduct. Indeed, since the Grinnell decision, the federal courts
have been unable to articulate a consistent means for distinguishing between
monopolists' proper and illegal conduct. For example, in certain cases, the Supreme
Court has held that a monopolist, absent a legitimate business justification, cannot
refuse to do business with a rival,92 while in other cases it has neglected to find such a
duty to deal.93 The Court has never adequately explained the distinction between these
two lines of cases.
The federal courts have also adopted inconsistent standards for monopolists' tying
and exclusive dealing arrangements. Under an exclusive dealing arrangement, a firm
requires a customer or supplier to deal only with it and not to deal with its
competitors. 94 Despite the anticompetitive effects of monopolists' exclusive dealing
arrangements, 95 the courts have taken a permissive approach to such conduct. The
87. For example, Chicago School commentators have argued that it should not be illegal for
monopolists to refuse to deal with their actual or potential rivals. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW at 242-44 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that unconditioned refusals to deal by
dominant firms should never be violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act).
88. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
89. See id. at 566-70.
90. See id. at 570-71, 576.
91. Id. at 570-71.
92. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (illegality
of Kodak's refusal to deal with independent service organizations that serviced its
photocopiers); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)
(illegality of skiing resort's refusal to continue to cooperate with rival skiing resort in providing
"multi-mountain" skiing ticket).
93. See Verizon Commc'ns., Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (holding that monopoly
telephone company had the right to refuse to give full access to its network to rivals).
94. See 1 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, at 169 (3d ed. 1992).
95. For a monopolist, such an arrangement constitutes a particularly effective means of
excluding its competitors from the relevant market. By tying up a low-cost supplier or effective
reseller, a monopolist can prevent actual or potential competitors from accessing the resources
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courts have analyzed such arrangements under the rule of reason, which requires the
fact finder to consider, among other things, the percent of the market foreclosed to
competitors by the arrangements. 96 When less than thirty to forty percent of the
suppliers or customers in a particular market have been subject to an exclusive dealing
arrangement, the courts have been reluctant to find an antitrust violation.97 Thus,
monopolists can escape liability for an exclusive dealing arrangement simply by
demonstrating that they did not foreclose a rival from a substantial percentage of
available suppliers or customers.
In tying cases, however, monopolists have had no such defense. Under a tie, a
monopolist agrees to sell one product in which it has market power (the tying product),
but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product in a
market in which the monopolist has less power. 98 Although tying and exclusive dealing
arrangements have similar competitive effects, 99 the federal courts have applied a per
se approach to tying arrangements. Monopolists repeatedly have been found to engage
in illegal tying arrangements simply because of their power in the market for the tying
product. 100
D. The Need for a Harvard/Chicago School Synthesis for Antitrust Regulation
The antitrust case law in the federal courts and agencies during the last forty years
makes it clear that neither the Harvard nor the Chicago School approach should be
used exclusively to analyze competitive conduct. The Harvard School's presumptions
necessary to compete in the monopolized market or in a related market to which it is attempting
to extend its monopoly power.
96. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,45 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("Exclusive dealing is an unreasonable restraint of trade only when a significant
fraction of buyers or sellers are frozen out of a market by the exclusive deal.").
97. See id. at 7, 32 (finding that exclusive contract which foreclosed thirty percent of the
market was not illegal); United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. Civ. A. 98-1232, 1998 WL
614485, at * 19 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998) (response to motion for summaryjudgment) (describing
forty percent threshold of illegality for exclusive dealing arrangements); Gonzales v. Insignares,
No. C84-1261A, 1985 WL 2206, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 1985) (granting summaryjudgment
for defendant when only forty percent of consumers were affected by exclusive arrangement).
98. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1958) (finding that railroad
illegally tied sales or leases of real estate to commitment to ship commodities on its system). The
Supreme Court has pointed out that the vice of tying arrangements stems from a defendant's
ability to exploit "its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied
product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere
on different terms." Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.
99. Like exclusive dealing, tying arrangements can be used by monopolists either to
perpetuate their power in the monopolized market or to extend that power into a related market.
See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 35-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that tying is
illegal when "power in the market for the tying product is used to create additional market
power in the market for the tied product" (emphasis in original)); Smithkline Corp. v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1061-62 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that bundling of patented and
nonpatented products violates section 2).
100. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17 (stating that large market share is sufficient to
prove requisite economic power); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947)
(requisite economic power inferred from defendant's use of patent monopoly); IBM Corp. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 131, 137 (1936) (same).
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of illegality deter beneficial competitive conduct. The courts overused the per se rule in
restraint of trade cases brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act. It simply made no
economic sense for the courts to presume the illegality of certain agreements among
competitors that were designed to enhance their efficiency, thereby benefiting
consumers.' 0 1 In merger and joint venture cases brought under section 7 of the Clayton
Act, the Harvard School was too preoccupied with the parties' market power, and it
caused courts to overlook the potential efficiencies resulting from the integration of
rivals' resources. °2 In monopoly cases under section 2 of the Sherman Act, the
Harvard School approach precluded large firms from engaging in aggressive
competitive conduct that could have benefited consumers.
0 3
The failings of the Harvard School caused the federal courts to reexamine their
approach to antitrust regulation. The arguments of the Chicago School scholars for an
antitrust regime based on respect for markets, economic efficiency, and consumer
welfare resonated with a federal judiciary concerned about the interventionist approach
of the Harvard School. However, as in the case of most revolutions, the Chicago
School revisions went too far.
When the rule of reason supplanted the per se rule as the dominant approach in
restraint of trade litigation, antitrust cases became more complicated and their outcome
became more difficult to predict. As a result, antitrust enforcement under section 1 of
the Sherman Act lost much of its deterrent effect. Antitrust practitioners were no longer
able to advise their clients with certainty of the type of conduct that would be permitted
or precluded. 104 The Chicago School's hegemony also increased confusion in merger
and joint venture cases. No longer could American firms rely on "bright-line" market
share concentration levels as markers of the legality of particular transactions. The
federal courts and enforcement agencies introduced efficiencies analysis into merger
and joint venture cases without articulating a clear standard for how to balance such
effects against the anticompetitive aspects of a transaction. Finally, the Chicago School
emphasized that monopolists should not be punished for obtaining their market power
as a result of a superior product or business acumen. However, in cases involving
monopolists' duty to deal, tying, and exclusive dealing, the more lenient Chicago
School approach only confused the standards of conduct for dominant firms.05
The federal courts and enforcement agencies need to move beyond the
Harvard/Chicago School dichotomy to an integrated approach to antitrust regulation. It
is possible to combine the clarity of the Harvard School with the economic
sophistication of the Chicago School. The next Part describes the first tentative moves
by antitrust commentators and the federal courts toward a "post-Chicago" approach to
antitrust that combines the best insights of both schools of antitrust analysis.
101. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
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III. MOVING BEYOND THE HARVARD/CHICAGO DICHOTOMY
TO A NEW ANTITRUST APPROACH
In recent years, some academics, lower federal courts, and antitrust enforcement
agencies have begun to move toward a new "post-Chicago" approach to antitrust. In its
recent decision in California DentalAss 'n v. FTC,10 6 the Supreme Court has indicated
that it may also be willing to adopt an antitrust approach that combines the best insights
of both the Chicago and Harvard Schools.
A. Post-Chicago Scholarship
There has been some recent movement among antitrust scholars toward a post-
Chicago approach that lies between the extremes of the Harvard and Chicago Schools.
Herbert Hovenkamp has stated that, in the last twenty years, "the Harvard School has
moved rightward, closer to the Chicago position, while at least some Chicago School
members have moderated their position to the left."10 7 Post-Chicago School economic
literature argues that certain market structures and competitive conduct "are much
more likely to have anticompetitive consequences than Chicago School antitrust writers
imagined."'
08
The post-Chicago commentators have concluded that Chicago School theories on
the perfection of markets are overly simplistic. In reality, markets do not always
behave as perfectly as the Chicago School assumes. In many markets, there is no even
playing field: competitive information is not equally available to all participants, entry
is not possible for new firms, or dominant firms may have gained a position that is
impossible to dislodge. Anticompetitive outcomes are more plausible in such markets
than the Chicago School concedes, and antitrust intervention is required to correct
competitive imbalances. 109
For example, high-technology networks, such as computer operating or
telecommunications systems, "are subject to significant 'network externalities,' which
means that they become more valuable to a particular user as a system gains larger
numbers of other users."' 10 Microsoft's "Windows" operating system for personal
computers is attractive to users because it has a large installed base and is compatible
with many applications programs."' Post-Chicago School scholars have recognized
that monopolists such as Microsoft have a unique ability to leverage the appeal oftheir
networks to extend their market power into other markets or to prevent new firms from
106. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
107. Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 927.
108. Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 270.
109. See id. at 279 ("[U]nder a more complex set of assumptions about how a market works,
anticompetitive outcomes seem more plausible."); Marina Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko: Intent
and "Sacrifice ", 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 171, 179 n.50 (2005) ("The Chicago view of exclusionary
conduct as rarely effective, and hence implausible, assumes that markets are robust. Market
robustness, in turn, assumes few entry barriers and good information, but these assumptions are
usually not valid in real markets. If markets are not as robust as Chicagoans assume, then
strategic exclusionary behavior is more plausible.").
110. Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 300.
111. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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entering the market they have already monopolized. Thus, it is appropriate for the
courts and agencies to preclude monopolists from engaging in certain types of conduct
that may be perfectly legitimate for less dominant firms.
1 12
B. The Lower Federal Courts' and Agencies' Movement Toward a New Approach
The lower federal courts and enforcement agencies have also begun to move toward
an intermediate approach between the extremes of the Harvard and Chicago Schools.
This movement has been most evident in restraint of trade cases brought under section
1 of the Sherman Act, where the courts and agencies have become dissatisfied with the
per se/rule of reason dichotomy and have begun to adopt other approaches to section 1
conduct. Although well-intentioned, this development has introduced even greater
uncertainty into section 1 analysis. The courts and agencies can now choose from
among several different approaches to collaborations among competitors.
In addition to the traditional per se rule and rule of reason, the courts and agencies
have endorsed various market-share-safe harbors and a so-called quick look at the
competitive effects of a restraint. Under the market-share-safe harbor, the courts have
required a plaintiff to prove that a defendant had a market share in excess of a
particular threshold. The restraint at issue has been found legal when the plaintiff failed
to meet its burden.' 13 The quick look absolves the plaintiff of the need to prove the
anticompetitive effects of a particular restraint, including proof of the defendant's
market power, at the initial stage of a case. Under the quick look, the plaintiff need
merely prove initially that the restraint is of a type that is likely to have anticompetitive
effects. After such a showing, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate a procompetitive justification for the restraint. " 4
112. See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 751 n.42 (1980)
("If a monopoly results that proves impervious to competitive inroads and is unjustified by scale
economies or other efficiencies, antitrust action in this or some other forum may be warranted,
even in the absence of abusive conduct.").
113. See, e.g., Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th
Cir. 1984) (stating that in rule of reason analysis, "the plaintiff first [must] prove that the
defendant has sufficient market power to restrain competition substantially... If not, the inquiry
is at an end; the practice is lawful" (citations omitted)).
114. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Where a practice has
obvious anticompetitive effects.., there is no need to prove that the defendant possesses market
power."); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 673-78 (3d Cir. 1993) (employing a quick
look analysis for agreements among universities on financial aid offerings to particular
students); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 593-94 (1st Cir. 1993)
(explaining the plaintiff's advantage in having a reduced burden of proof). The DOJ and FTC
have also adopted versions of the quick look approach, shifting the burden to defendants to
prove the efficiencies of inherently anticompetitive conduct. See Mass. Bd. of Registration in
Optometry, I 10 F.T.C. 549 (1988) (using quick look to analyze restrictions on advertising
imposed by association of optometrists); Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among
Competitors, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,161, at 20,853 (Apr. 12, 2000) [hereinafter
Collaboration Guidelines] (providing for a quick look form of the rule of reason for restraints
that do not fall within a traditional per se category but nevertheless present a clear "likelihood of
anticompetitive harm").
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By the end of the 1990s, the federal courts and enforcement agencies had adopted
inconsistent approaches to section 1 of the Sherman Act. It had become unclear to
antitrust practitioners whether the courts and agencies would apply a per se, rule of
reason, market-share-safe harbor, or quick look approach to particular restraints. To
clarify the standards for analyzing section 1 restraints, the Supreme Court, in 1999,
granted certiorari in California Dental.
C. The Supreme Court's New Approach in California Dental
This author has argued that the federal courts and enforcement agencies should
abandon the false distinctions between the per se rule, the rule of reason, the quick
look, and other fixed categories of antitrust analysis.' 5 Instead of relying on separate
categories of analysis, the courts and agencies should judge antitrust conduct under a
continuum, which would allow them to tailor their analysis to the likely competitive
effects of the particular conduct at issue. In 1999, in California Dental, the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized the proposal of this author for such a sliding scale
approach to Sherman Act analysis.
California Dental involved advertising restrictions imposed by the California
Dental Association.116 The restrictions precluded dentists from advertising their prices
as "low" or of similar effect." 7 The Ninth Circuit had held that the restrictions should
be analyzed under the quick look because they made it "more difficult for consumers to
find a lower price and for dentists to compete on the basis of price."'"18 The Supreme
Court concluded that a quick look analysis was not appropriate, because it was not
intuitively obvious that the advertising restrictions were likely to have anticompetitive
effects. 119 The restrictions might, for example, have promoted competition by
eliminating misleading and unverifiable discount advertising. 120 The Court recognized,
however, that the alternative to the quick look need not necessarily be a full rule of
reason market power analysis. 12 1 Instead of being divided into discrete categories,
Sherman Act analysis should be viewed as a continuum under which courts can engage
in a variety of inquiries "meet for the case."' 22 Citing Philip Areeda, this author, and
other commentators, the Court stated that, in Sherman Act cases, "the quality of proof
required should vary with the circumstances."' 123 Turning to the advertising restrictions
115. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
116. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 760 (1999).
117. Seeid. at 760-61 n.1.
118. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated, 526 U.S. 756
(1999).
119. California Dental, 526 U.S. 756, 771-72, 779-81.
120. Id. at 771-72.
121. The Court stated that its rejection of the quick look did not mean a "call for the fullest
market analysis.... [Not] every case attacking a less obviously anticompetitive restraint... is a
candidate for plenary market examination." Id. at 779.
122. Id. at 781.
123. Id. at 780 (citing AREEDA, supra note 8, at 1507; Kolasky, supra note 8, at 41-42;
Piraino, Jr., Rule of Reason, supra note 6, at 1771).
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at issue, the Court held that "a less quick look" was required and remanded the case
"for a fuller consideration of the issue."
' 124
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO ANTITRUST REGULATION
Building on the Supreme Court's decision in California Dental, the courts and
agencies can adopt a new approach to antitrust analysis that categorizes all conduct on
a continuum based upon its likely effect on consumers. The type of analysis applied by
a court or agency would vary, depending upon the location of the relevant conduct on
the continuum. Under such an approach, the courts and agencies could divide antitrust
analysis into two broad categories: (1) presumptively legal or illegal conduct, and (2)
conduct requiring a prioritized market analysis.
A. Classifying Competitive Conduct on a California Dental Continuum
The Supreme Court's decision in California Dental has given the lower federal
courts and enforcement agencies a means of reconciling the Harvard and Chicago
Schools. The courts and agencies can now use both the presumptions of the Harvard
School and the empirical economic analysis of the Chicago School to confirm the
consumer welfare effects of competitive conduct. To adopt an inquiry "meet for the
case," as required by California Dental, the courts and agencies should categorize all
competitive conduct on a continuum according to its likely effect on consumers. 12 5 In
order to confirm that effect, the courts and agencies will have to undertake varying
degrees of inquiry depending upon the type of conduct at issue. When the competitive
effect of the relevant conduct is obvious, the courts and agencies can indulge
presumptions similar to those favored by the Harvard School; when the competitive
effect of the relevant conduct is not clear on its face, the courts and agencies can
engage in a more detailed economic analysis similar to that favored by the Chicago
School.
Under California Dental, fact finders need not confine their inquiry to the types of
analysis previously identified by the courts and agencies. As the Supreme Court
pointed out: "[O]ur categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than
terms like 'per se,' 'quick look,' and 'rule of reason' tend to make them appear. 126
Indeed, the time has come for the courts and agencies to abandon these outmoded
phrases, which artificially limit fact finders' discretion. There is no longer any need for
the courts and agencies to confine themselves to a false choice between the per se
rule's conclusive presumption of illegality and the rule of reason's formless pursuit of
all conceivable economic circumstances.
124. Id. at 781.
125. Id. See also Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29,35 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating
that, in California Dental, the Supreme Court "backed away from any reliance upon fixed
categories and toward a continuum"); In re N. Tex. Specialty Physicians, 2005-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 75,032, at 103,463 (FTC, Nov. 29, 2005) (stating that California Dental and
subsequent lower court and agency decisions "go beyond the simple dichotomy between
categories like 'per se' or 'rule of reason,' and establish a continuum within which behavior can
be analyzed").
126. California Dental, 526 U.S. at 779.
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In cases where judicial experience has demonstrated the likely competitive effect of
the relevant conduct, the courts need not find the conduct conclusively legal or illegal.
By using presumptions, the courts and agencies can retain the clarity of the Harvard
School without sacrificing their search for the right economic answer. The courts and
agencies should simply presume that the most likely competitive effect did, in fact,
occur and shift the burden of proof to the party attempting to demonstrate that the
actual outcome was contrary to normal expectations. Such an approach would be fairer
to litigating parties than the Harvard School's per se standard, which conclusively
presumes the illegality of conduct without giving defendants a rebuttal opportunity.
The approach would ensure that, even when a court or agency was relatively certain
about the competitive effect of the relevant conduct, it would not make a final decision
on its legality without considering appropriate rebuttal arguments.
By the same token, when the likely competitive effect of the relevant conduct is not
clear on its face, the courts and agencies need not inquire into all possible economic
conditions before deciding on the conduct's legality. Even in such cases, the courts and
agencies can avoid the endless empirical inquiry of the Chicago School. Although
presumptions of legality or illegality would not be appropriate in such cases, the courts
and agencies can prioritize their inquiry so that they first consider potentially
dispositive factors, such as the parties' market power. This approach will permit the
courts and agencies to dispose of many cases at an early stage if the plaintiff fails to
meet its initial burden of proof.
The proposed approach will prevent judges, juries, and antitrust regulators from
straying into the analysis of economic factors that are beyond their competence, and it
will allow them to develop guidelines for competitive conduct that can be easily
understood by the business community and by fact finders. Rather than viewing the
various types of competitive conduct in isolation, this continuum-based approach
would group together conduct, the legality of which could be determined in a similar
manner. Under such an approach, all antitrust analysis can be divided into two broad
categories: (1) presumptively legal or illegal conduct, and (2) conduct requiring a
prioritized market analysis.
B. Presumptively Legal or Illegal Conduct
The federal courts and enforcement agencies have been analyzing competitive
conduct under the federal antitrust laws for more than a century. They have enough
experience to make an initial judgment at the outset of a case about the likely impact of
particular conduct on consumers. In most cases, courts and agencies will be able to
make a decision on the face of the relevant conduct. Indeed, given their years of
experience in antitrust cases, the courts and agencies should be able to afford a
presumption of legality or illegality to most competitive conduct.
27
The structure of most transactions should reveal whether it is appropriate to apply a
presumption of legality or illegality. The federal courts and antitrust enforcement
agencies have consistently concluded that vertical mergers and joint ventures between
noncompetitors and vertical resale restraints imposed by suppliers on their distributors
127. See Polygram Holding, 416 F.3d at 37 ("[A]s economic learning and market experience
evolve, so too will the class of restraints subject to summary adjudication.").
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almost always have a net beneficial effect on consumers.' 28 Therefore it is appropriate
for the courts and agencies to classify such vertical transactions at the presumptively
legal end of the continuum of antitrust analysis.
The federal courts and enforcement agencies have also consistently concluded that
horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices, restrict competition, or allocate
territories almost always restrict competition without any offsetting efficiency benefit
for consumers.129 Such horizontal agreements should be classified at the presumptively
illegal extreme of the continuum of antitrust analysis.
Once a presumption applies, the relevant party should have an opportunity to rebut
the presumption by proving that the actual purpose of the transaction was to effect a
competitive outcome contrary to that which would normally be expected from its
structure. It should be relatively easy for the courts and agencies to confirm whether
the appropriate party has met its burden of proving that the purpose of the transaction
was contrary to normal expectations. Fact finders can discern the purpose of parties'
conduct by determining the credibility of their witnesses, their explanations for their
conduct, and the relevance and significance of memoranda, minutes, hand-written
notes, e-mails, and other documents that they have produced.'30 Nearly every day,
judges and juries are called upon to use such means to determine the purpose of
defendants' behavior in contract, tort, employment, and criminal disputes.1
31
Until the empirical approach of the Chicago School became ascendant,' 32 the
federal courts were willing to use defendants' purpose as a proxy for the effects of their
conduct on competition. In 1962, in Poller v. CBS,13 3 the Court pointed out that
"motive and intent play leading roles" in antitrust litigation. In 1979, the Court
concluded in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,134 that a defendant's purpose for particular
competitive behavior "tends to show [its] effect." Most recently, in Business
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,135 Justice Stevens, citing this author,
pointed out in a dissenting opinion that "in antitrust, as in many other areas of the law,
motivation matters and factfinders are able to distinguish bad from good intent.'
136
128. See infra notes 135-37, 140-49, and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 156-70 and accompanying text.
130. See Crane, supra note 62, at 15 (stating that fact finders excel in determining "who did
what, when, and why").
131. For example, courts must often determine whether employers' decisions on hiring and
promotion are made for a legitimate purpose or for an illegal discriminatory reason. See, e.g.,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,246 (1989) (calling these "mixed-motives" cases),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as
recognized in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
132. Chicago School adherents believe that economic data gives a more objective view of
actual competitive effects than evidence of a defendant's intent. See A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose
Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (stating that intent evidence
is "even more ambiguous than the economic data it seeks to illuminate").
133. 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
134. 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
135. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
136. Id. at 754 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585,610-11 (1985); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. ofNew Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S.
232,243 (1980); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,224-26 n.59 (1940);
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The
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C. Conduct Requiring a Prioritized Market Analysis
Despite the courts' and agencies' decades of experience in antitrust cases, they will
not be able to discern the likely competitive effects of all conduct on its face. When the
conduct at issue is equally likely to benefit or to harm consumers, the courts and
agencies will have to utilize an approach closer to the empirical economic analysis of
the Chicago School than to the Harvard School's presumptions. The ultimate
competitive effect of exclusive dealing, tying, monopoly conduct by individual firms,
horizontal mergers, andjoint ventures will depend upon the particular circumstances of
the relevant market. In such cases, rather than applying presumptions in favor of a
particular outcome, the courts and agencies should allocate the normal burdens of
proof and rebuttal to the plaintiff and defendant. Even in such cases, however, the
courts and agencies need not revert to the "catch-all" approach of the traditional rule of
reason; they can simplify their analysis by prioritizing the factors they consider.
The most critical factor should be the defendants' market power. Firms cannot harm
consumers unless they possess substantial market power in the relevant market. Thus,
the courts and agencies should establish a market power threshold for the plaintiff s
prima facie case. If a plaintiff fails to meet its initial burden ofproving market power in
excess of the applicable threshold, a court or agency can dismiss the case without
considering other economic factors.
Figure 1 illustrates how presumptively legal and illegal conduct and conduct
requiring a prioritized market analysis would be arrayed on the continuum of antitrust
analysis:
Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated Restrictions on Distribution, 63 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 1, 4, 16-19 (1988) [hereinafter Piraino, Jr., Quality Motivated Restrictions]).
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Vertical Transactions
Vertical Mergers
Vertical Joint Ventures
Vertical Resale
Degree
of
Analysis
Exclusive Deal Tying Horizontal Transactions
Monopoly Conduct Price-Fidng Agreenents
Horizontal Mergers Territorial Allocations
Horizontal Joint Ventures Output Restrictions
Presumptively Legal Conduct Conduct Requiring Market Analysis Presurptively Illegal Conduct
Conduct Most Beneficial to Consumers Conduct Most Adverse to Consumers
Figure 1. The continuum of antitrust analysis.
The "x"-axis begins with conduct most likely to benefit consumers and extends to
conduct most likely to harm consumers. Presumptively legal and illegal conduct lie at
the opposite extremes of the x-axis. The "y'-axis begins with conduct requiring the
least amount of analysis and extends to conduct requiring the most detailed analysis.
Both presumptively legal and illegal conduct lie at the low point of the y-axis, while
conduct requiring a prioritized market analysis lies at an intermediate point that
requires the courts and agencies to engage in a more in-depth factual analysis.
The following Parts explain how the courts and agencies can use this continuum-
based approach to evaluate presumptively legal conduct, presumptively illegal conduct,
and conduct requiring a prioritized market analysis.
V. PRESUMPTIVELY LEGAL CONDUCT
The courts and agencies should apply a rule of presumptive legality to vertical
resale restraints, vertical mergers, and joint ventures. The presumption of legality
should apply once a defendant has proven that a restraint of trade, merger, or joint
venture is between noncompetitors. A plaintiffcan rebut the presumption of legality for
a vertical restraint of trade, vertical merger, or joint venture by proving that, despite the
apparently benign structure of the transaction, the defendants were actually attempting
to accomplish an anticompetitive objective.
A. Vertical Restraints of Trade
Vertical resale restraints constitute agreements between a supplier and its dealers,
distributors, or other resellers. Vertical resale restraints are usually designed for a
2007]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
procompetitive purpose and have a minimal anticompetitive effect. Vertical resale
restraints only affect "intrabrand competition," that is, competition among dealers in
the resale of the manufacturer's own product. Such restraints may increase resale prices
for the manufacturer's product, but they do not adversely affect interbrand competition.
Indeed, their only impact on interbrand competition is beneficial.' 37
Consider a requirement by General Motors that its distributors sell automobiles only
from certain authorized locations. The distributors might argue that the restriction
limits their ability to compete against other General Motors dealers. General Motors,
however, could legitimately argue that the benefits of the restriction outweigh its
adverse effects. By limiting competition among General Motors' dealers, the restriction
encourages dealers to invest in the types of point-of-sale services that are attractive to
consumers. Such actions by the dealers help General Motors to compete more
effectively against other automobile manufacturers, such as Toyota, which have
recently been gaining market share at General Motors' expense.
1 38
1. The Presumption of Legality
The courts have recognized since Sylvania that vertical resale restraints should be
upheld because they have the beneficial effect of encouraging dealers to provide
quality-related services that make a manufacturer's products more competitive against
other brands.1 39 Internal growth or vertical mergers by manufacturers into the resale
level are treated leniently under the antitrust laws because the integration of productive
activities is obvious. Contract integration achieved through vertical resale restraints
should be given at least as much deference.140 Indeed, such restraints are preferable to
vertical integration because they can achieve the productive purposes of integration
without eliminating all intrabrand competition. Because vertical resale restraints are
almost always procompetitive and beneficial to consumers, they should be afforded a
rebuttable presumption of legality.141
137. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (applying rule of reason
rather than per se approach to Sylvania's territorial restrictions on its television dealers on
grounds that restrictions only adversely affected intrabrand competition among Sylvania dealers
and benefitted interbrand competition between Sylvania and other television manufacturers).
138. See Jathon Sapsford, Norihiko Shirouzu & Joseph B. White, Toyota Maps Plan to
Displace GMas Top Car Maker, WALL ST. J.,Nov. 19, 2005, atAl (describing Toyota's plans
to overtake General Motors as "the world's biggest maker of cars").
139. See, e.g., Sports Center, Inc. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982); Del Rio
Distrib., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1979); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980); see also Ricchetti v. Meister Brau, Inc.,
431 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1970) (decided before Sylvania, but foreshadowing the court's eventual
move).
140. See Bork, supra note 3, at 264.
141. Several commentators have argued that vertical restrictions should be per se legal. See
id. at 288; Ernest Gellhom & Teresa Tatham, Making Sense Out of the Rule ofReason, 35 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 155, 178 (1984); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic
Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 13 (1977).
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2. The Defendant's Rebuttal Case: Proving Induced Discrimination
A plaintiff can rebut the presumption of legality for vertical resale restraints by
proving that the purpose of the restraint was not to enhance the supplier's efficiency
but simply to placate dealers attempting to limit competition from their rivals. It is
appropriate to place the burden on plaintiffs to rebut the presumption of legality for
vertical resale restraints because dealers are rarely able to induce suppliers to take an
adverse action against other dealers that the suppliers would not have taken on their
own. In most cases, suppliers have legitimate, independent business reason for limiting
competition among their dealers. In certain cases, however, dealers may be able to
meet their burden of proving an anticompetitive purpose for a vertical resale restraint.
Consider a case in which a group of long-term General Motors dealers become
concerned about the price-cutting activities of a group of recently appointed dealers.
The older dealers demand that General Motors terminate the franchises of the newer
dealers. If General Motors acceded to the older dealers' demands, such conduct would
have no purpose or effect other than to limit price competition. Such conduct should be
illegal because it eliminates consumer choice without any offsetting efficiency
benefit. 1
42
A court's goal in cases of induced discrimination should be to determine whether
the discrimination was initiated independently by a supplier or induced by one or more
buyers in order to disadvantage a rival. Discriminatory actions against buyers are more
likely to be initiated by suppliers for legitimate reasons than to be induced by rival
retailers for anticompetitive purposes. Thus, in order to rebut the presumption of
legality for vertical restraints, a plaintiff should be required to prove: (1) that a buyer
and supplier had a mutual commitment to discriminate against a rival of the buyer,
either by driving the rival from the market or raising its costs; (2) that the supplier's
only reason to effect the discrimination was to meet the anticompetitive demands ofthe
buyer; and (3) that the rival was competitively disadvantaged as a result of the actions
of the supplier and the buyer. Once a plaintiff has met this burden of proof, however, it
142. The Supreme Court applied the per se rule to such conduct in United States v. General
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (applying per se rule when a group of automobile dealers
induced General Motors not to sell to automobile discount houses). Unfortunately, however, the
Court has opted for a rule of reason approach when only one buyer has convinced a supplier to
take the relevant action. See Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998) (declining to
apply a per se analysis to a decision by a local telephone company to switch from one supplier
to another); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (refusing to apply per
se rule when a single dealer induced manufacturer of electronic calculators to terminate rival
dealer). The Supreme Court failed to recognize in Sharp and Nynex that, in an induced
discrimination case, the number of conspirators at each level of the supply chain has no
economic relevance. Regardless of whether one or more buyers complain about a rival's prices
or other competitive conduct, a supplier should not be permitted to knuckle under to its buyers'
anticompetitive demands to exclude a rival from the market. As Justice Stevens pointed out,
citing this author in his dissent in Sharp, the relevant inquiry in induced discrimination cases is
"to insure that a manufacturer's motive for a vertical restriction is not simply to acquiesce in his
distributors' desires to limit competition among themselves." Sharp, 485 U.S. at 750, n.14
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Piraino, Jr., Quality Motivated Restrictions, supra note 136, at
17).
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would not have to introduce evidence of the market power of the supplier or the
inducing buyer, nor of any other conditions affecting the relevant market.
This approach will encourage suppliers to continue to impose and enforce legitimate
performance-based standards on their buyers, but it will also deter suppliers from
conspiring with their large buyers to discriminate against smaller buyers.
B. Vertical Mergers and Joint Ventures
Vertical mergers and joint ventures are between firms that are not actual or potential
competitors. As in the case of vertical resale restraints, a defendant should be able to
raise a presumption of legality for vertical mergers and joint ventures merely by
proving their existence. Such transactions should be presumptively legal because they
do not restrict any actual or potential competition between the parties.
1. The Presumption of Legality
Most courts and agencies have upheld mergers and joint ventures among parties that
are not actual or potential competitors. 43 The courts and agencies should apply a
presumption of legality to all vertical mergers and joint ventures, regardless of the
parties' market shares in the markets affected by the transaction. For example, a merger
between Microsoft and General Motors would create a gigantic enterprise with more
than $230 billion in annual revenue. 144 However, the new entity would not be able to
exercise any more power in the automobile or computer operating system markets than
the companies could have exercised prior to the transaction.
Joint ventures need not necessarily involve noncompetitors in order to be classified
as vertical transactions entitled to a presumption of legality. Unlike mergers, which
eliminate all competition between the parties, joint ventures are formed to accomplish
specific objectives, and they allow their partners to compete in areas outside the
narrow scope of the venture.145 Thus, competitors may enter into joint ventures which
143. For a discussion of the courts' lenient approach to vertical mergers, see Michael H.
Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 514 (1995). For decisions upholding joint ventures, see, for example,
United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 96-101 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (holding joint venture to
construct a communications satellite network does not violate antitrust laws if parents were not
actual or potential competitors in the relevant market). See also Robert Pitofsky, A Framework
for Antitrust Analysis ofJoint Ventures, 74 GEO. L.J. 1605, 1608-09 (1986) (asserting thatjoint
ventures among noncompetitors in unconcentrated markets should be legal per se).
144. "[General Motors], still the world's largest manufacturer, remains a colossus, with more
than $190 billion in annual revenue." Jathon Sapsford, Joseph B. White & Dennis K. Berman,
GMShares Sink to 23-Year Low as Woes Mount, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2005, at Al. Microsoft
had approximately $40 billion in revenue in its 2005 fiscal year. See MIcRosOFT CORP., ANNuAL
REPORT 2005 (2005), http://www.microsoft.com/msft/reports/ar05/staticversion/index.html.
145. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr, Beyond Per Se, Rule ofReason or MergerAnalysis: A New
Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 76 Mn'. L. REv. 1, 7 (1991) [hereinafter Piraino, Jr.,
Beyond Per Se] ("While mergers eliminate all competition between the parties, joint ventures,
by virtue of their limited scope, leave the parties free to compete in areas not covered by the
joint venture."); Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 114, at 20,853 ("The competitive effects
from competitors' collaborations may differ from those of mergers .... Most mergers
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are limited to areas in which they are not currently competing. Competitors, for
example, often form joint ventures to develop or produce new products that they could
not have developed on their own. If the purpose of the venture is to allow the partners
to enter new markets from which they would have been individually foreclosed, the
venture will not restrict competition in any manner.
146
Consider a joint venture between General Motors and Ford to develop a hybrid
engine that can boost fuel efficiency by combining a traditional gasoline motor with an
electric motor.' 4 7 Assume that General Motors and Ford do not have the financial
capacity to independently make the multibillion dollar investment necessary for the
development of such an engine."48 Such a joint venture would not have any
anticompetitive effects because it would not limit any preexisting competition between
the parties. General Motors and Ford would be able to continue to compete in the
production and sale of automobiles. The only effect of such ajoint venture would be to
expand the alternatives available to consumers by facilitating the commercialization of
a new technology that neither company would have been able to develop on its own. 49
In some cases, even downstream-marketingjoint ventures allow firms to enter new
markets or produce new products. Indeed, certain unique products can be marketed
only through a joint venture. A venture that allows the marketing of such a product
cannot restrict competition because, in the absence of the venture, the relevant product
would never have existed. In denying a per se approach in BM/, for example, the
Supreme Court pointed out that the blanket license was a type of "different product"
and that the composers' arrangement was "necessary to market the product at all.' ' °
completely end competition between the merging parties in the relevant market(s). By contrast,
most competitor collaborations preserve some form of competition among the participants.").
146. See Joseph Kattan, Antitrust Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative
Efficiency and the Rewards of Innovation, 61 ANTmUST L.J. 937,940 n. 18 (1993) (describing
joint venture among pharmaceutical companies that gave partners access to patents necessary to
produce a multivalent childhood vaccine that could be effective against several diseases at
once). This type ofjoint venture promotes competition by permitting "the introduction of a new
competitor that otherwise might never have come into being." Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures
Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARv. L. REv.
1007, 1018 (1969).
147. General Motors has already entered into a joint venture with DaimlerChrysler AG and
BMW AG to develop such a hybrid engine. See Norihko Shirouzu & Jathon Sapsford, Power
Struggle: As Hybrid Cars Gain Traction, Industry Battles Over Designs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19,
2005, at Al.
148. In May, 2005, the debt ratings of General Motors and Ford were downgraded to "junk
status." Jonathon Fuerbringer, High-Yield Market Survives G.M and Ford, But Now What?,
N.Y. TiMES, June 12, 2005, at B6. In the first nine months of 2005, General Motors' losses
alone totaled $3.8 billion. Sapsford et al., supra note 144, at Al.
149. For example, a joint venture between United Technologies and Rolls Royce for the
manufacture of a new jet engine allowed the parties to produce, at an estimated cost of $600
million, a product that Rolls Royce did not have the financial capacity to make independently.
See U.S. DOJ Antitrust Guidelines Concerning Research Joint Ventures, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,120, at 20,677-78 (1980). See also United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 94 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (upholding joint venture for the production of communications satellites based on
fact that, because of high start-up costs, the joint venture partners "were unlikely both to enter
the field separately").
150. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1979).
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Sports leagues also constitute a type of marketing joint venture necessary for the
existence of a unique product. Neither collegiate nor professional athletics could
operate without a league organization. Leagues regulate the various activities required
to carry on a sport: the number of persons on a team, the rules of play, restrictions on
player mobility, and revenue sharing. The Supreme Court recognized in NCAA v.
Board of Regents15' that such league rules "are essential if the product is to be
available at all."' 152 Because they make possible the marketing of a unique product,
amateur and professional sports leagues usually do not offend the antitrust laws.1
53
2. Rebutting the Presumption of Legality
A plaintiff can rebut the presumption of legality for a vertical merger or joint
venture by demonstrating that it was designed to foreclose competitors of the parties
from one of the markets affected by the merger. Although the courts and enforcement
agencies have allowed most vertical mergers and joint ventures to proceed, some
decisions have attacked such transactions on the grounds that they cause "potential
foreclosure" in one of the markets in which the parties compete. Foreclosure problems
may arise both at the upstream supplier level, and at the downstream distribution level.
For example, if a shoe manufacturer acquired a national chain of shoe retailers, it could
foreclose competing manufacturers from access to the retail outlets. 154 If an automobile
company acquired a spark plug supplier, it could foreclose competing automobile
manufacturers from purchasing from that supplier.'
55
151. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
152. Id. at 101. Certain other Supreme Court decisions have implicitly recognized the
legality of marketing joint ventures that facilitate entry into new markets. In Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944), the Court did not question the legality of the Associated Press
joint venture itself because, according to one commentator, "[flew if any newspapers would
have been sufficiently affluent to perform the news gathering services provided by the AP joint
venture." Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the
Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1007, 1057-58 (1969). In United States v. Penn-
Olin Chemical Co., 389 U.S. 308 (1967) (per curiam), the Court upheld ajoint venture after the
district court found that neither party was likely to have entered the relevant market in the
absence of the joint venture. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F. Supp. 917, 933-
34 (D. Del. 1965).
153. The Eighth Circuit, in Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976), concluded
that "the NFL assumes some of the characteristics of a joint venture," and that "the unique
nature of the business of professional football renders it inappropriate to mechanically apply per
se illegality rules." (emphasis in original). Robert Bork has stated that "some activities can only
be carried out jointly. Perhaps the leading example is league sports." BoRK, supra note 3, at
278. The only relevant antitrust issue for sports leagues is whether their related restraints on
competition are no broader than required to effect the legitimate interests of individual teams in
maintaining the viability of their joint venture. See infra notes 177-94 and accompanying text.
154. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (precluding merger between
shoe manufacturer and shoe retailer on grounds that manufacturer would be able to foreclose
competing manufacturers from access to retailer's outlets).
155. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562,568,574 (1972) (precluding Ford's
acquisition of spark plug manufacturer); N. Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 399 F.2d
953 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (precluding joint venture between natural gas distributor and pipeline
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Courts and agencies have never developed a bright-line test as to the amount of
foreclosure that should be permitted for a particular merger or joint venture.156 Thus,
business executives have little guidance as to the types of vertical mergers or joint
ventures they will be permitted to pursue. The proposed approach would clarify the
circumstances in which vertical mergers or joint ventures would be permitted or
precluded.
Vertical mergers or joint ventures should only be precluded when the transaction
gives the parties control over a resource essential for competition in one of the markets
affected by the transaction. A plaintiff should only be able to rebut the presumption of
legality for a vertical merger or joint venture by demonstrating that, in order to
compete effectively in the market affected by the transaction, it must be able to access
the products or services of one of the parties. In such a case, the parties to the merger
or joint venture would have the power to exclude their rivals from the relevant market.
The Walt Disney Company, for example, owns ABC and ESPN. Cable systems
must be able to carry both of those networks in order to be competitive. 5 7 If a large
cable company such as Cablevision acquired Disney, it conceivably could prevent
competing cable companies from carrying ABC or ESPN. In such a case, it would be
appropriate for a court or agency either to preclude the merger entirely or to insure that
competitors could carry ABC and ESPN on their cable systems upon reasonable
terms.158
company that gave distributor the ability to preclude its competitors from obtaining natural gas
through pipeline).
156. Courts, for example, have precluded vertical mergers involving various degrees of
market foreclosure. Courts have precluded vertical mergers involving market foreclosures of
7.4% (see Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 449 F. Supp. 1158, 1182-83 (D.
Haw. 1978)), 20 % (see Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368, 1371-72 (9th Cir.
1978)), 45 % (see Hamischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151, 1158-59 (E.D. Wis.
1979)), and 75% (see Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 981-82 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978)), and they have approved mergers with market
foreclosures of eight percent (see Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 509 F. Supp. 115, 125 (D. Del.
1981)) and 2.7% (see United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1280 (W.D.
Pa. 1977)).
157. See Comments of American Cable Association at 3, In re Annual Assessment of the
Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, MB Docket No.
03-172 (FCC Sept. 11, 2003). available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
nativeorjpdf=pdf&iddocument"6515082093 ("A core set of video services is essential to the
viability of a cable system. This programming includes the major broadcast networks and 'must-
have' or 'marquee' satellite programming, including ESPN (Disney) .. ").
158. The agencies have allowed vertical mergers in the entertainment and
telecommunications industries to proceed under consent orders which insure that competitors
are not foreclosed from accessing resources essential for competition in one of the markets
affected by the transaction. See Proposed Final Judgement and Competitive Impact Statement,
United States v. AT&T Corp., 59 Fed. Reg. 44,158, 44,162-63 (Aug. 26, 1994) (allowing
merger between long-distance telephone company and cellular telephone company, on condition
that telephone company provide cellular phones to its rivals upon equal terms); Agreement
Containing Consent Order, In re Time Warner Inc., No. 961-0004, 1996 FTC LEXIS 389
(allowing merger between Time Warner and Turner Broadcasting, on condition that merged
company give its rivals nondiscriminatory access to its cable operations).
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VI. PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL CONDUCT
Horizontal agreements among sellers or buyers to fix prices, restrict output, or
allocate territories almost always harm consumers. Courts and agencies should
presume the illegality of such conduct and shift the burden to defendants to prove that
their purpose in collaborating was not to limit competition but to enhance the
efficiency of a legitimate joint venture beneficial to consumers.
A. The Presumption of Illegality
The courts have applied the per se rule to horizontal cartels among sellers to fix
prices, restrict output, or allocate territories. In most cases, such arrangements have a
clear anticompetitive effect and lack any efficiency justifications.' 59 Cartels are
incapable of producing any economic benefit because they involve no integration of
the parties' resources. Horizontal cartels raise prices, reduce output, and limit
consumers' range of choices. Indeed, such direct restrictions on interfirm rivalry strike
at the heart of the open competitive system that the antitrust laws were designed to
protect. 60 Competitors restrict the free play of market forces when they agree to raise,
lower, fix, or stabilize prices in concert.161 When rivals agree to fix a common price for
their products without combining their resources in any manner, the arrangement will
be incapable of enhancing efficiency; its only effect will be to limit price competition
among the parties, thus reducing consumers' choice. Indirect price-fixing schemes,
such as restrictions on output, have the same anticompetitive impact, 62 and horizontal
159. Naked agreements among competing sellers to fix prices, restrict output, or allocate
territories have been considered per se illegal since the earliest days of the Sherman Act. See
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,293 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899) (refusing to consider possible justifications for horizontal price fixing); Diane P. Wood,
The Incredible Shrinking Per Se Rule: Is an End in Sight?, Presentation Before the Antitrust
Section of the American Bar Association 3 (Apr. 1, 2004) (on file with author) ("The area in
which the per se rule continues to be invoked most often, and continues to have real bite, is that
of the hard-core cartel. By the term 'hard-core cartel,' antitrust lawyers normally mean an
agreement between horizontal competitors ... to fix prices or to engage in equivalent behaviors
..... "). Although the federal courts have taken a less aggressive approach in many antitrust areas
during the last three decades, they never have wavered in their condemnation of horizontal
cartels. In 2004, Justice Scalia (rarely an advocate of aggressive antitrust enforcement) described
cartels as "the supreme evil of antitrust." Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,408
(2004).
160. See Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020, 1023 (1987) (stating that "the
economic goal of antitrust policy is to increase the material welfare of society through the
instrument of interfirm rivalry").
161. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,221 (1940) (approving per
se illegality of any conspiracy among competitors designed to raise, lower, fix, or stabilize
prices on the grounds that such conspiracies directly interfere with "the free play of market
forces").
162. See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 464-66 (1986) (holding illegal a
refusal by dentists to provide patients' x-rays to insurers); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-96 (1978) (holding illegal a ban on competitive bidding); United
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territorial allocations are no less pernicious. In fact, horizontal territorial allocation
often has a more adverse effect on competition than horizontal price fixing.' 63 The
parties to a price-fixing arrangement may continue to compete with each other in
certain nonprice areas, such as customer service. Customer and territorial allocations,
however, eliminate all competition among the parties, whether price or nonprice.
Consider a bald agreement among General Motors, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler to
market an automobile with a fuel-efficient hybrid engine within separate areas of the
country. The automobile companies would be free, within their separate territories, not
only to price the new automobile in any manner they saw fit, but also to limit its
production or to refuse to make certain accessories or services available to consumers.
Cartels among buyers can harm consumers just as surely as cartels among sellers.
Like seller cartels, buyer cartels should be presumptively illegal. "Oligopsony" pricing
occurs when buyers agree to engage in joint purchasing negotiations and to offer a
common purchase price to their suppliers. 164 Such arrangements prevent competition
among buyers on input prices. The prices of raw materials and finished goods
purchased for resale are an important component of buyers' overall costs. Consumers
benefit when buyers seek their own innovative ways of limiting such costs and pass on
the cost savings to their customers. Input prices are likely to reach their lowest levels
when buyers are competing aggressively against each other to obtain the best possible
terms from their suppliers. When buyers abandon such competition and offer identical
prices to their suppliers, they lose all incentive to obtain a cost advantage over each
other. Furthermore, such buyers are more likely to cooperate to retain the benefits of
any cost savings for themselves. Once a group of buyers has successfully conspired to
reduce their collective input prices, they will be more inclined to conspire with each
other to keep their resale prices high. 165 Indeed, economic studies indicate that buyers
engaged in oligopsony pricing are less likely than other buyers to pass on the benefit of
lower input prices to consumers.
166
The anticompetitive effects of horizontal price fixing, output restrictions, and
customer and territorial allocations among buyers and sellers are clear enough to
excuse the plaintiff from a demonstration of the defendant's market power. A
States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337-38 (1969) (holding illegal the
exchange of price information); Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336,
1364 (N.D. Ill. 199 1) (holding illegal the reduction by a sports league of the number of games
broadcast).
163. The courts have consistently applied the per se rule to horizontal customer, territorial
or, output allocations as well as to horizontal price fixing. See United States v. Topco Assocs.,
405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (applying per se rule to horizontal territorial allocation); United States
v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying per se rule to
horizontal customer allocation). Even Chicago School commentators have concluded that
horizontal market division is as great an evil as horizontal price fixing. See, e.g., Posner, supra
note 48, at 292.
164. See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 907 F.2d 510,515 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that an
oligopsonist "could form an alliance with other oligopsonists in the relevant market and attempt
to depress prices and increase profits").
165. See Jonathon B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, J. EcoN. PERSP., Fall 2003,
at 27, 30.
166. See Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Monopsony as an Agency and Regulatory
Problem in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 949, 967 (2004) ("[L]ower input prices do not lead
to lower consumer output prices.").
20071
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
presumption of illegality for these restraints would preserve the deterrent effect of the
current per se approach to such conduct. When the detrimental effects of a restraint are
apparent, there is no need to inquire into market power. The Supreme Court recognized
in NCAA v. Board ofRegents that "[a]s a matter of law, the absence of proof of market
power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output.' '167 If a restraint is clearly
anticompetitive on its face, the burden should shift to the defendant to come forward
with proof of some procompetitive virtue that justifies the restraint.168
Some Chicago School commentators have argued that plaintiffs should have the
initial burden of proving market power even for such horizontal restraints as price
fixing. They have emphasized that only firms with market power can injure
competition over a meaningful period because the marketplace ultimately will undercut
the effectiveness of any anticompetitive restraints as consumers switch to substitutes or
new firms enter the market. 69 There are, however, several reasons to dispense with a
market power analysis of horizontal price fixing, output restrictions, and territorial and
customer allocations. For one thing, markets do not always react as quickly as some
commentators have assumed: "[f]or reasons including market inertia and information
failures... a small conspirator may be able to impede competition over some period of
time." 170 Furthermore, there is little to be gained and much to be lost by introducing the
complexities of a market power test into the analysis of such inherently suspect
conduct. The courts risk few mistakes by dispensing with a market power analysis of
conduct which is likely to harm competition in most cases.'
71
On the other hand, requiring a market power analysis complicates antitrust trials,
wastes judicial resources, and makes plaintiffs more reluctant to bring cases, thus
reducing the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws. A clear rule prohibiting naked
horizontal restrictions of competition precludes undesirable behavior at its inception
and prevents it from ripening into a full-blown competitive threat. As Professor Areeda
has asserted, "The defendants have little moral standing to demand proof of power or
effect when the most they can say for themselves is that they tried to harm the public
but were mistaken in their ability to do so.'
' 72
167. 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984).
168. See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29,36 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("If, based upon
economic learning and the experience of the market, it is obvious that a restraint of trade likely
impairs competition, then the restraint is presumed unlawful and, in order to avoid liability, the
defendant must either identify some reason the restraint is unlikely to harm consumers or
identify some competitive benefit that plausibly offsets the apparent or anticipated harm.").
169. See, e.g., Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal
Arrangements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology,
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 579, 602-03 (1993) (stating that the marketplace will discipline firms that
attempt to restrain trade if they lack substantial market power); M. Laurence Popofsky & David
B. Goodwin, The "Hard-Boiled" Rule of Reason Revisited, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 195,203 (1987)
(indicating that two firms that agree to a horizontal restraint are unlikely to injure competition if
they lack market power).
170. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,434-35 (1990).
171. As Professor Areeda has stated, "Once we decide that a class of practice is in the vast
generality of cases detrimental and unjustified, why bother with the complicated and expensive
inquiry into power?" Phillip Areeda, The Changing Contours of the Per Se Rule, 54 ANTITRUST
L.J. 27, 28 (1985).
172. AREEDA, supra note 8, at 1510 (1986).
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Defendants would not be unduly disadvantaged by bearing the burden of proving a
justification for horizontal price fixing, output restrictions, and territorial and customer
allocations. Indeed, a shifting of the burden of proof would be a vast improvement over
the current per se approach, which gives defendants no opportunity to show that they
had a legitimate purpose for a horizontal restraint. Placing that burden of proof on the
defendant is fair since it will have access to the documents and witnesses most
probative of the actual competitive effect of a horizontal restraint. 173 The defendant's
internal documents and testimony from its own employees will usually reveal whether a
particular restraint was intended to enhance the party's efficiency or merely to restrict
competition. Firms usually can document in advance their efficiency objectives for
particular restraints. A defendant's failure to produce such evidence may indicate that
the real purpose for a restraint was anticompetitive.
B. The Plaint if's Initial Burden of Proof
Restraints of trade are only illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act if they are
undertaken pursuant to a conspiracy among competing firms.174 Thus, in order to raise
a rebuttable presumption of illegality, a plaintiff must demonstrate that competing
firms have entered into an agreement to fix prices, restrict output, or allocate territories
or customers. The conspiracy may be either explicit or tacit. George Hay has explained
that "[t]he prototype... [of an explicit cartel] is the smoke-filled room in which all the
rivals engage in face-to-face communication."'' 7 5 Explicit agreements allow the
participants to bargain openly on a consensus industry price level, to communicate to
each other their intention to adhere to the consensus price, and to establish mechanisms
for monitoring and enforcing such adherence. However, tacit conspiracies to fix prices
or allocate customers or territories should be no less illegal than explicit agreements.
There is now a consensus among economists that tacit price-fixing arrangements are
just as harmful to consumers as explicit price-fixing agreements. 176 Firms engaged in
tacit collusion can duplicate the conditions that occur under an explicit cartel. Like an
express agreement, a tacit arrangement involves the reaching of a consensus on an
above-market price and the adoption of a means of enforcing adherence to that
173. See Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh, Information Problems in Merger Decision
Making and Their Impact on Development ofan Efficiencies Defense, 62 ANTrrRUST L.J. 23,27
(1993) ("Efficiency considerations and general principles of law suggest that the party with
access to the relevant information should bear the burden of proving an issue dependent on that
information.").
174. Section 1 precludes "[e]very contract, combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
175. George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, andAntitrust Law, 67 CORNELLL. REV.
439, 452 (1982).
176. See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 205-06
(1985) ("Section 1 attacks collusion because it is a joint effort to reap monopoly profits, and
tacit collusion has a very similar impact."). Commentators have concluded that, since "there is
no vital difference between formal cartels and tacit collusive arrangements... the tacit colluder
should be punished like the express colluder." Id.
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consensus. With greater assurance of their rivals' acquiescence, firms gain the
confidence necessary to persist in pricing levels above the competitive norm.
17 7
It will be relatively easy for a plaintiff to meet its burden of proof when competitors
have entered into an explicit horizontal conspiracy. However, the courts and agencies
need to adopt a clearer standard by which plaintiffs can prove the existence of a tacit
horizontal agreement. Tacit agreements often occur in "oligopoly" markets, where
there are a small number of firms competing with each other. Recent models of "game
theory" explain that oligopolists are able to maintain a price equilibrium at a level
above that which would prevail in a perfectly competitive market (i.e., above marginal
cost) simply by reacting to each other's pricing practices and without communicating
directly with each other. 178 Such independent parallel conduct does not constitute an
illegal "agreement" within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The courts and agencies have found it difficult to confirm when oligopolists have
entered into illegal conspiracies rather than simply engaging in permissible parallel
conduct. In oligopoly pricing cases, the courts have engaged in an extended search for
various "plus factors" necessary to prove the existence of a formal agreement among
the defendants. As a result, the courts have rendered a conflicting series of opinions
that have only served to confuse business executives as to the dividing line between
permissible and illegal oligopoly conduct.'
79
Instead of engaging in a fruitless search for plus factors, the courts and agencies
should concentrate on the purpose of defendants' conduct in oligopoly pricing cases.
The courts and agencies should infer a conspiracy among oligopolists when they act in
a manner that is contrary to their immediate self-interest and makes no economic sense
other than as an invitation to join in a price-fixing or market-allocation arrangement.
Indeed, actions by rivals against their own self-interest can communicate their consent
to a higher price level just as clearly as a cartel's express commitment to a price-fixing
177. See Hay, supra note 175, at 446-47 (stating that firms engaged in tacit coordination can
gain a mutual understanding of the consensus industry price and a mutual sense of confidence
that all firms will adhere to that price).
178. In an oligopoly, where there are so few firms in the relevant market, it is easier for finns
to make pricing decisions "in reference to the likely reaction of competitors." Robert A. Milne
& Jack E. Pace III, The Scope of Expert Testimony on the Subject of Conspiracies in a Sherman
Act Case, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 36, 37 (emphasis omitted). Each firm recognizes its
interdependence with other firms in the market and understands that "its optimal price is a
function of the price charged by its rivals." BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 175, at 200. See
also Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1251 (lth Cir. 2002) ("[T]he distinctive
characteristic of oligopoly is recognized interdependence among the leading firms: the profit-
maximizing choice of price and output for one depends on the choices made by others.").
179. Recent Supreme Court decisions on the conspiracy issue have been particularly
confusing. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (permitting
inference of section 1 conspiracy among manufacturer and its distributors only when evidence
"tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were
acting independently"); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)
(using Monsanto standard in declining to find predatory pricing conspiracy in case in which
defendants had no rational business motive for entering into arrangement). There are no clear
guidelines by which fact finders can determine how to exclude the possibility that a defendant
had a legitimate independent purpose for its conduct under the Supreme Court's
Monsanto/Matsushita standard.
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arrangement. When a firm risks an immediate loss of volume, profits, or customer
goodwill in announcing a higher price, it sends a strong signal to its rivals that it is safe
for them to observe the same price. Such rivals will then be more likely to take the risk
of acting against their own interests and falling in line with the higher price.
The cartel-enhancing effects of actions against oligopolists' self-interest are evident
in the retail gasoline market. Automobile drivers do not need to know price changes in
advance, because they have no way of storing excess gasoline (or changing their
driving habits) in anticipation of a price increase. Thus, gasoline service stations have
no legitimate independent reason for pre-announcing price changes. Indeed, pre-
announcements of price increases are contrary to a station's independent interests,
because they may cause consumers to immediately begin patronizing other stations. If
one gasoline station does pre-announce a price increase, the announcement may signal
to other stations the original station's intention to propose a higher consensus price.
The other stations will have more confidence in the original station's intentions
because of the risk it is taking of alienating its customers. Such a bold initiative by the
original station eliminates uncertainty as to its willingness to participate in a tacit
arrangement of price coordination. If other stations respond by pre-announcing a
similar price increase, they send reinforcing signals back to the original station (and to
all the other stations in the area) that the original station had, indeed, correctly judged
its rivals' willingness to observe the consensus price. The responding stations' pre-
announcements have added credibility because these stations also are risking their
customers' goodwill in announcing a higher price. Such signals mutually reinforce a
cartel's objectives and are no different, from an economic standpoint, than the explicit
assurances that each member of a price-fixing cartel receives from its fellow
conspirators.
Thus, a plaintiff should be able to meet its burden of proof in an oligopoly pricing
case by demonstrating that one or more firms signaled their intention to initiate a price
increase in a manner contrary to their individual self-interest and all firms in the market
subsequently accepted the increase by acting in a manner no less contrary to their own
interests. Under such circumstances, the initiating firm's action should be construed as
an offer to participate in a price-fixing arrangement, and the other firms' conduct in
response should be deemed an acceptance of that offer. This approach precisely
identifies the "plus factors" necessary to prove the existence of a formal conspiracy
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
C. The Defendant's Rebuttal Case: Proving Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures
A court or enforcement agency should presume the illegality of a defendant's
conduct once a plaintiff has proven the existence of an explicit or tacit price-fixing,
output restraining, or territorial allocation conspiracy among competitors. The burden
should then shift to the defendant to demonstrate that the conduct at issue was not
likely to have the anticompetitive effects that normally result from a horizontal cartel.
The defendant can meet its burden of proof by showing that its purpose in
implementing the relevant restraint was to insure the effectiveness of an integrated joint
venture designed to enhance its efficiency. In such a case, the courts and agencies
should view the defendant's conduct not as a naked restraint of trade with purely
anticompetitive effects but as an ancillary restraint that has the potential to benefit
consumers.
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1. The Ancillary Restraints Doctrine
This author has argued that, if ajoint venture is legal, the courts should also permit
the parties to the venture to enter into any agreements among themselves that are
required to carry out the legitimate purposes of the venture.1 80 This approach, which
has been referred to as the "ancillary restraints doctrine,"'1 81 was first established in an
1898 case, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.8 2 In that case, Judge (later
President and Chief Justice) William Howard Taft distinguished between "naked"
restraints, which should be illegal on their face because they are unrelated to any
efficiency-enhancing integration, and "ancillary" restraints, which are permissible
because they are necessary to promote the legitimate objectives of a cooperative
arrangement.
18 3
For nearly eighty years, the federal courts neglected Judge Taft's approach. In the
last twenty-five years, however, the ancillary restraints doctrine has reemerged in the
lower federal courts, as they have begun to adopt a more sophisticated approach to
antitrust analysis. In several cases, the federal circuit courts have separately examined
competitive restraints among joint venture partners to determine whether they were
necessary to promote a venture's legitimate objectives.IS4
Until 2006, the Supreme Court had never explicitly adopted the ancillary restraints
doctrine. However, in Texaco Inc. v. Dagher8 5 the Court stated in dicta that the
doctrine could apply to certain restraints implemented in connection with joint
ventures. The joint venture at issue had combined the gasoline refining and marketing
operations of Shell and Texaco in the western United States. Prior to the formation of
the joint venture, Shell and Texaco had competed in the sale of their separate brands of
gasoline. After the marketing of the brands was combined in the joint venture, it
established a uniform price for the sale of the two types of gasoline. The Ninth Circuit,
180. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, supra note 145, at 56 ("Any related competitive restrictions
that are necessary for the legitimate purposes of a joint venture should be per se legal.").
181. See Piraino, Jr., High Technology Competition, supra note 31, at 139 (describing the
ancillary restraints doctrine).
182. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
183. Id. at 282-83.
184. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958,964 (10th Cir. 1994) (denial
of membership in credit card system); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792
F.2d 210, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noncompetition agreement among agents of van lines); Polk
Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188-89 (7th Cir. 1985) ("A court must distinguish
between 'naked' restraints, those in which the restriction on competition is unaccompanied by"
noncompetition agreement between two stores in a shopping center); see also Polygram
Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding FTC decision that
restrictions on marketing of particular concert recordings were not ancillary to joint venture
formed to market other concert recordings). The Collaboration Guidelines provide for an
ancillary restraints approach to section 1: "If... participants in an efficiency-enhancing
integration of economic activity enter into an agreement that is reasonably related to the
integration and reasonably necessary to achieve its procompetitive benefits, the Agencies
analyze the agreement under the rule of reason, even if it is of a type that might otherwise be
considered per se illegal." Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 114, at 20,855.
185. 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006).
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citing this author, applied an ancillary restraints analysis to the pricing arrangement.8 6
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the arrangement was per se illegal under the ancillary
restraints doctrine, because it was not necessary to promote the legitimate objectives of
the marketing joint venture between Shell and Texaco.187
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, holding that it was
not per se illegal for the Shell/Texaco joint venture to set the prices for its products. 188
The Court concluded that the pricing arrangement between Shell and Texaco did not
constitute the type of price fixing that should be per se illegal, "because Texaco and
Shell Oil did not compete with one another in the relevant market-namely, the sale of
gasoline to service stations in the western United States-but instead participated in the
market jointly through their investments in [the joint venture]."' 189 The alleged price
fixing by Shell and Texaco was in fact "little more than price setting by a single entity.
• . and not a pricing agreement between competing entities with respect to their
competing products."' 90 As a result, the Ninth Circuit should not have precluded the
pricing arrangement under the per se rule. Since the plaintiffs had waived their rights to
proceed under either the rule of reason or the quick look, the Court reversed the
decision of the Ninth Circuit. 191
Although the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, it did acknowledge that the
ancillary restraints doctrine should apply in certain circumstances. The Court stated
that the "doctrine governs the validity of restrictions imposed by a legitimate business
collaboration, such as a business association or joint venture, or nonventure activities.
Under the doctrine, courts must determine whether the nonventure restriction is a
naked restraint on trade, and thus invalid, or one that is ancillary to the legitimate and
competitive purposes of the business associations, and thus valid."'192 Turning to the
pricing arrangement at issue, the Court concluded that the ancillary restraints doctrine
had "no application," because the restraint at issue did not affect activities outside the
scope of the joint venture: "the business practice being challenged involves the core
activity of the joint venture itself-namely, the pricing of the very good produced and
sold by [the joint venture]."'1 93
Although Dagher concluded that the rule of reason should apply to internal joint
venture rules such as the pricing arrangement for the Shell and Texaco brands of
gasoline, the logic of the decision implies that such rules should be exempt from
scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act altogether. Indeed, it was only because of
the unique procedural posture of the case that the Dagher Court was unable to reach a
conclusion. Once the Court decided that the per se rule was inapplicable, it could
dispose of the case entirely, because the quick look was equally inapplicable and the
186. Dagher v. Saudi Ref., Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Piraino, Jr.,
Antitrust Approach to Collaborations, supra note 6, at 1188-89).
187. Id. at 1122.
188. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. at 1281.
189. Id. at 1279-80.
190. Id. at 1280.
191. Id. at 1281.
192. Id. at 1280-81 (citation omitted).
193. Id. at 1281. Furthermore, the Court stated that, even if the ancillary restraints approach
did apply, the joint venture's "pricing policy is clearly ancillary to the sale of its own products."
Id. at 1281.
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plaintiffs had waived their right to proceed under the rule of reason.194 The Court was
clear, however, in its conclusion that the Shell/Texaco joint venture was a single entity
and that, by virtue of their participation in the joint venture, Shell and Texaco had
ceased to be competitors in the market for the sale of gasoline in the western United
States. 95 Future cases, unencumbered by the unique procedural posture of Dagher,
should recognize that firms are incapable of conspiring within the meaning of section 1
when they combine their operations in a joint venture. In such cases, any internal rules
necessary for the effective operation of thejoint venture do not restrict any competition
that was not already eliminated as a result of the venture's formation. Accordingly,
such rules should not be subject to challenge under section 1 as a potential restraint of
trade.
Thus, relying on Dagher, the courts and agencies can easily determine the legality
of horizontal price fixing and customer and territorial allocations that are implemented
in connection with legitimate joint ventures. If such arrangements constitute an internal
rule necessary for the effective operation of the joint venture, a defendant should be
able to argue that the rule cannot be illegal under the antitrust laws. If such an
arrangement affects competition outside the scope of ajoint venture, a defendant will
have to defend the legality of the arrangement under the ancillary restraints doctrine.
Under the dicta of Dagher, the legality of any restraint on "nonventure activities"
would depend upon whether it was "ancillary to the legitimate and competitive
purposes" of the venture. 96 As this author argued in a series of articles beginning in
1991, the courts and agencies should make that determination by confirming whether
the restraint at issue is "reasonably necessary" to promote the legitimate purposes of a
joint venture.197
2. Proving a Legitimate Joint Venture
The arrangement at issue cannot constitute a legitimate joint venture unless it
involves more than a simple cooperative agreement between competitors. No economic
benefit is possible when the parties' cooperation amounts only to the making ofjoint
business decisions or a mere coordination of parallel activities. 98 By coordinating their
194. Id. at 1280 nn.2-3 (The "[r]espondents have not put forth a rule of reason claim" and
"for the same reasons that per se liability is unwarranted here, we conclude that petitioners
cannot be held liable under the quick look doctrine." (italics in original)).
195. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
197. See Piraino, Jr., Antitrust Approach to Collaborations, supra note 6, at 1189 ("The
courts and enforcement agencies should require joint venture partners to prove that competitive
restraints are 'reasonably necessary' for the accomplishment of a venture's efficiency-enhancing
purposes."); Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, supra note 145, at 56 ("An effective standard of
legality would be whether an ancillary restraint is 'reasonably necessary' to accomplish the
purposes of the joint venture."); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling Competition and
Cooperation: A New Antitrust Standardfor Joint Ventures, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 871,924
(1994) [hereinafter Piraino, Jr., Reconciling Competition] ("The courts would uphold any
restraint that is 'reasonably necessary' to accomplish the legitimate purposes of the cooperative
arrangement ... ").
198. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 230 (D.C. Cir.
1986). In United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), the Court held a division of
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efforts, the parties may only be attempting to insure the effectiveness of an
anticompetitive scheme. Indeed, effective coordination of competitors' pricing or
production activities is one of the hallmarks of a cartel. For example, the members of
price-fixing cartels must agree on some minimum level of coordination and
enforcement in order to be successful. 199 Such arrangements are naked restrictions of
competition that should be deemed conclusively illegal.20 0
In order to meet their burden of proving a legitimate joint venture, defendants must
demonstrate that the transaction joins together business functions or other resources
previously held separate by the parties. 20 1 A cooperative arrangement among
competitors can only generate efficiencies when the parties integrate their resources in
some way. They may pool certain resources and assume certain common risks in order
to create what is, in effect, a new entity. Items contributed by the parties may include
such assets as employees, intellectual property, facilities, or distribution rights. In
addition, the parties may share profits and losses and assume some of the joint
venture's obligations to third parties. The parties' mutual contribution of assets and
assumption of risks should create an entity that allows them to accomplish a
competitive objective that they could not have achieved independently. If the parties
could have accomplished their purpose separately from the joint venture, no
justification exists for the harm caused to consumers or competitors by any incidental
horizontal restrictions. However, as long as the joinder between the parties is
substantial enough to create efficiencies that exceed the capabilities of each party
individually, the parties can be viewed as partners rather than as competitors, and the
restrictions need not be presumed to be illegal.
Consider the hypothetical research and development joint venture between Ford and
General Motors, described in Part V.B. 1, supra, and designed to develop a fuel-
efficient-hybrid engine. Since Ford and General Motors would have integrated their
relevant research operations in the venture, the venture would have access to more
intellectual property and research capacity than would Ford and General Motors
operating independently. The parties would have created an entity more capable of
producing a hybrid engine than the companies acting on their own. Certain incidental
restrictions on competition among the parties can be justified by such ajoint venture's
beneficial effect on consumers.
markets among independent grocery stores per se illegal. The Court emphasized that the
members of the cooperative association operated independently and did not pool earnings,
capital, management, or advertising resources. Id. at 598. As the Collaboration Guidelines
recognize, "[t]he mere coordination of decisions on price, output, customers, territories, and the
like" does not constitute sufficient integration to qualify for joint venture treatment.
Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 114, at 20,855.
199. Indeed, the courts often use such coordination and enforcement to infer the existence of
a per se illegal price fixing conspiracy. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50
(1968) (inferring a price fixing conspiracy when a newspaper hired outside agents to enforce
maximum resale prices), overruled on other grounds, State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997);
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45 (1960) (inferring an illegal conspiracy
from wholesalers' policing and enforcement of suggested resale prices).
200. See Arthur, supra note 39, at 377 ("The paradigm of a naked restraint is a classic cartel
price-fixing agreement.").
201. See id. at 376 ("[E]conomic integration.., is vital to productive efficiency.").
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3. Proving Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures
Once a defendant proves the existence of a legitimate joint venture, a court or
agency should consider the appropriateness of any related restrictions on competition
agreed to by the partners of that venture. Building on the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Dagher, the courts and agencies can establish a simple method for
confirming the legality of such restraints. If the restraint at issue constitutes an internal
rule necessary for the effective operation of an integrated joint venture, it should be
regarded as single entity conduct exempt from section 1 entirely. The courts and
agencies only need to consider the reasonableness of restraints that affect competition
outside the scope of a joint venture's activities. For such restraints, an ancillary
restraints analysis is appropriate. The courts and agencies should uphold any restraints
that are reasonably necessary to promote a joint venture's legitimate purposes, and they
should preclude any restraints that are broader than necessary to further such
objectives.
Internal joint venture rules exempt from antitrust scrutiny should be readily apparent
to fact finders. Consider the hypothetical Ford/General Motors research and
development joint venture for a hybrid engine, described in Part V.B. 1, supra. Ford
and General Motors should be allowed to exchange the proprietary information
required to conduct the venture's research programs; they should be able to limit the
parties who can participate in the joint venture or who can access the technology
developed by the joint venture;20 2 and they should be permitted to agree not to
separately undertake the venture's research activities or to otherwise compete with the
venture. All of these activities should be exempt from antitrust scrutiny, because they
do not eliminate any competition between the parties that continued after the joint
venture's formation. The exchange of proprietary information is naturally contemplated
by any research and development joint venture. Indeed, such joint ventures could not
operate effectively without a free exchange of technological information with their
partners. Restrictions on the parties who can join a research and development joint
venture or access its technology are no less necessary for the effectiveness of such a
venture. Finally, by agreeing not to compete with their own joint venture, Ford and
General Motors would simply be acknowledging a natural effect of the joint venture's
formation. Joint venture partners are unlikely to compete with their own affiliate in any
202. Courts should not allow access restrictions, however, when ajoint venture controls an
"essential facility" necessary to compete in the relevant market. The courts have required joint
ventures that control such facilities to grant open access to all qualified parties. See Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (precluding members of New York Stock
Exchange from denying access to private wire system necessary for broker-dealers to trade in
over-the-counter securities market); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,
364 U.S. 656 (1961) (finding it per se illegal for industry-wide standards-setting organization to
refuse to provide its "seal of approval" to plaintiff's gas burner); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (requiring Associated Press to allow all qualified newspapers to
receive its wire reports); United States v. Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (requiring railroad
association which controlled only means of access across Mississippi River to St. Louis to allow
other railroads to use facilities upon equal terms).
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event, because such competition merely reduces their profits as partners of the
venture.203
In certain cases a defendant may be able to prove, as in Dagher, that a pricing
arrangement should be exempt from antitrust scrutiny because it constitutes an internal
rule necessary for the effective operation of ajoint venture. A price-fixing arrangement
might be necessary for the effectiveness of an industry-wide venture for the marketing
of a unique product (such as the copyrighted musical compositions in BMl). 204 It
should be particularly easy for defendants to prove that price-fixing arrangements are
necessary for purchasingjoint ventures. Most purchasing joint ventures are formed by
sellers in order to reduce their purchasing costs. 20 5 Since purchasing joint ventures
themselves have a net beneficial effect, sellers should be permitted to take the steps
necessary to meet their legitimate objectives.20 6 In most cases, it will be necessary for a
purchasing joint venture to submit a single bid on behalf of all its members in order to
achieve its legitimate purpose. The partners to a purchasing joint venture cannot
integrate their purchasing operations and reduce costs without allowing the joint
venture to negotiate purchase prices on their behalf The submission ofjoint bids is a
natural consequence of the integration of purchasing functions in a joint venture.
Indeed, after they have combined their purchasing functions in a joint venture, the
partners should have no choice other than to submit joint bids to their suppliers.
Restrictions that affect competition outside the scope of a joint venture should
continue to be subject to antitrust regulation under the ancillary restraints approach
203. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 169 (1964) ("If the parent
companies are in competition.... it may be assumed that neither will compete with the progeny
in its line of commerce.").
204. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1979). There is other precedent in the
Supreme Court for allowing a defendant to prove the potential beneficial effects of price fixing.
See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933) (upholding an
arrangement under which coal producers fixed the price of coal in order to eliminate
"destructive trade practices"); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)
(sustaining a Chicago Board of Trade rule which froze grain prices during the period the market
was closed).
205. Purchasing joint ventures have a minimal anticompetitive effect because they operate at
the upstream level of the production process. As long as they are confined to the purchasing
level, such joint ventures cannot affect their partners' decisions on output or on pricing. Some
commentators have argued that joint purchasing arrangements should be treated even more
leniently than joint ventures among sellers. Jonathon M. Jacobson & Gary J. Dorman, Joint
Purchasing, Monopsony, and Antitrust, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 4 (1991) ("[T]he antitrust
treatment of joint buyer activity should not be symmetric to the treatment of joint seller
activity."); see also Piraino, Jr., Reconciling Competition, supra note 197, at 922 ("Purchasing
cooperatives ... are not likely to increase the price or limit the availability of consumer end
products.").
206. Many commentators have argued that the antitrust laws should not interfere with
buyers' joint purchasing activities. E.g., Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 205, at 23
("[A]ntitrust rules should be designed to avoid interfering with most joint purchasing
activities."); Michael K. Lindsey, Joint Purchasing Arrangements, 61 ANTTRUST L.J. 401,402
(1993) (suggesting that competitors that agree to jointly purchase resale inventory can buy at
lower prices and increase efficiency).
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described in Dagher.207 Consider the hypothetical Ford/General Motors research and
development joint venture for a new hybrid engine. Assume that Ford and General
Motors agree to fix the price at which they will sell hybrid engines using the
technology developed by the joint venture. Such a restriction should be illegal under an
ancillary restraints analysis. The pricing arrangement would not be reasonably
necessary to accomplish the joint venture's legitimate purposes. In order to effectively
develop a new hybrid engine, the parties would have no need to limit competition in
their ultimate use of the engine. Thus, the pricing arrangement should be illegal as a
naked restraint of trade.
VII. CONDUCT REQUIRING A PRIORITIZED MARKET ANALYSIS
The likely effects of certain competitive conduct will not be obvious from its
structure or the parties' purpose. In such cases, the courts and agencies will have to
engage in a more complex market analysis. A market-based analysis is appropriate in
cases involving monopoly conduct by individual firms, tying and exclusive dealing,
and horizontal mergers and joint ventures. Such conduct should be arrayed at the
middle portions of the antitrust continuum, where there would be no presumption of
legality or illegality. Instead, the plaintiff and the defendant would have the normal
burdens of proof and rebuttal.
The courts and agencies can simplify their analysis in monopolization, tying,
exclusive dealing, and horizontal merger and joint-venture cases by establishing a
market-power threshold for the plaintiff's prima facie case. If a plaintiff fails to meet
its initial burden of proving market power in excess of the applicable threshold, a court
or an agency can dismiss the case without considering other more complex economic
factors (such as entry conditions in the market or the efficiencies likely to be generated
by the relevant transaction).
Consumers cannot be harmed in monopolization, tying, exclusive dealing, or
horizontal merger or joint-venture cases when defendants lack substantial market
power. A firm cannot unilaterally extend or perpetuate its market power if it holds less
than a monopoly share of the relevant market. If such a firm attempts to compete other
than on the merits, other firms should be able to step in and steal market share from it.
When the parties to a merger or a joint venture have a relatively small market share,
they will not be able to raise prices above the normal competitive level after the
transaction is consummated. ° s Similarly, without a significant share of the applicable
product market, a manufacturer cannot force a substantial number of its customers to
buy the product exclusively from it or to forego purchasing the product from its
competitors.
20 9
Once a plaintiff meets its burden of proving market power in a case involving
monopolization, tying, exclusive dealing, or a horizontal merger or joint venture, the
burden should shift to the defendant to demonstrate that, despite its market power, the
net effect of its conduct will be beneficial to consumers. A monopolist may have
obtained a large share of the relevant market, not because of any exclusionary business
207. See supra Part VI.C.1.
208. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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practices, but simply because it provided consumers with the best products at the
lowest possible prices. The net effect of an exclusive dealing arrangement may not be
to exclude competitors from the relevant market but to provide enhanced point-of-sale
services to consumers. A tying arrangement may be designed to insure the effective
functioning of two related products. A merger or joint venture between relatively large
competitors may allow the new entity to achieve efficiencies in the production or
delivery of products to consumers that outweigh the adverse competitive effects of the
combination.
A. Tying and Exclusive Dealing Arrangements
Tying and exclusive dealing arrangements are just as likely to enhance as to limit
competition. Such arrangements can further a manufacturer's effectiveness in
competing against other brands;210 they can also deprive consumers of choice and
competitors of access to important markets.2 1 Thus, it is not appropriate for courts or
enforcement agencies to indulge in any presumptions of legality or illegality for such
210. The courts have upheld tying arrangements in cases where two products had to be used
in conjunction with one another to insure the proper functioning of either product. See Mozart
Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1351 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding
requirement that automobile dealers purchase replacement parts from automobile manufacturer);
Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653,656-57 (1 st Cir. 1961) (approving
tie-in of unloading device and silo on grounds that separate sales had led to widespread
customer dissatisfaction); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556-57 (E.D.
Pa. 1960) (approving sale of components of television antenna as single system in order to
assure effective functioning of system), affidper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). The courts have
also permitted exclusive dealing arrangements that enhance interbrand competition. See Roland
Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that an exclusive
dealing arrangement may encourage a dealer to promote the manufacturer's product more
vigorously); Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1252 (3d Cir. 1975)
(stating that a hotel chain's exclusionary agreements with franchisees were justified, in part, by
the chain's desire to strengthen its position against its competitors); Howard P. Marvel,
Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1982) (stating that exclusive dealing can increase a
distributor's promotional efforts).
211. By requiring customers to deal exclusively with it, a supplier can prevent its
competitors from accessing potential sales outlets. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that exclusive dealing can
deprive other suppliers of a market for their goods and other buyers of supply sources). A buyer
also can deprive competitors of a potential source of supply by requiring suppliers to sell solely
to it. See id. Tying arrangements can force consumers to buy products they would not otherwise
have purchased or to pay higher prices than they would in a competitive market. When a firm is
successful in tying the purchase of one product to another, it can raise barriers to entry in the
tied product market (thereby excluding potential competitors) and can insulate potentially
inferior products from competition by current manufacturers. See id. at 14-15 (explaining
anticompetitive effects of tying arrangements); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51-
52 (1962) (holding that the block booking of films for television raised barriers to entry for
potential competitors and was illegal), overruled in part by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink,
Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209,215-19,234-
48 (1986) (explaining how ties can raise costs).
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conduct. Instead, courts and agencies should allocate the ordinary burden of proof to
the plaintiff and the ordinary burden of rebuttal to the defendant.
1. The Plaintiff's Initial Burden of Proof
The plaintiff in a tying or exclusive dealing case should have the initial burden of
proving that the parties to such arrangements hold a market share in excess of thirty
percent.212 Consumers or competitors cannot be harmed by tying or exclusive dealing
arrangements implemented by firms that control less than thirty percent of the relevant
market. Without a significant share of the tying product market, a manufacturer cannot
force a buyer to purchase a tied product or to pay a supracompetitive price. Consumers
are not unfairly disadvantaged when they can freely choose whether or not to purchase
the product. An exclusive dealing arrangement also cannot adversely affect competitors
unless a defendant has enough power to foreclose a significant number of supplier or
customer outlets. A firm without market power will be unable to "lock up" a significant
number of suppliers or customers through exclusive dealing arrangements. As a result,
competitors will have access to sufficient remaining outlets to compete effectively in
the relevant market.2 13
2. The Defendant's Rebuttal Case
Once a plaintiff has demonstrated that a defendant controls more than thirty percent
of the relevant market, the defendant should have the opportunity to rebut by proving
that it had a procompetitive purpose for a tying or exclusive dealing arrangement. In
the case of tying arrangements, the courts can avoid the complicated task of weighing
the defendant's efficiency justifications against the plaintiff s proof of market power.
The procompetitive justifications for tying arrangements are limited, but, once proven,
they should be decisive. A tying arrangement should be permitted if a defendant can
demonstrate that the tie was necessary for the quality, safety, or effectiveness of its
products. A defendant may be able to prove that two products had to be bundled in
order to function effectively. A defendant should also be able to justify its conduct
212. In Jefferson Parish, the Supreme Court found that a market share of thirty percent was
not sufficient to prove the illegality of a tying arrangement. 466 U.S. at 31-32. Since Jefferson
Parish, many lower federal courts have used thirty percent as a market-share threshold for tying
arrangements. See, e.g., Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792,797 (1st
Cir. 1988); M. Leff Radio Parts, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 387, 399 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
The concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish also applied a thirty percent market-share threshold
to exclusive dealing arrangements. 466 U.S. at 46 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
213. The courts have traditionally judged the legality of exclusive dealing arrangements on
the basis of whether they foreclose a significant number of buyer or seller outlets from
competitors. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 334 (1961)
(holding a requirements contract legal in the context of the competitive bituminous coal market);
Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357 (1922) (holding that an
exclusive dealing contract between a pattern manufacturer and a merchant substantially lessened
competition in violation of the Clayton Act); Joyce Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co.,
555 F. Supp. 271,278 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that an exclusive cola franchise was not illegal
because it encouraged rather than foreclosed competition).
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whenever it can show that a new product integration had a plausible efficiency benefit.
If the newly packaged product enhances performance or lowers cost, it should be
.. 214permitted even if it was adopted in part to preclude competition. As one
commentator has stated, "[I]f engineering data suggest that a new product is superior to
the product it replaces, antitrust inquiry should end.",2t5 Assume, for example, that a
tobacco company developed a special filter that could be attached to a cigarette and
would prevent any harmful by-products from entering smokers' lungs. Such a
technological breakthrough would give the tobacco company a significant advantage
over its competitors. However, the antitrust laws should not preclude the company
from requiring consumers to purchase cigarettes with the filter attached.
The courts will have to undertake a more detailed balancing analysis for exclusive
dealing arrangements with customers. Such arrangements can enhance competition by
encouraging distributors to promote a manufacturer's products more aggressively, but
they can also restrict competition by denying other manufacturers access to the
customers covered by the exclusive deal. It is therefore insufficient for a defendant
merely to show that it had a procompetitive purpose for an exclusive dealing
arrangement with its customers. The courts must balance such purpose against the
potential foreclosure of outlets resulting from the arrangement. The greater the
manufacturer's market share, the more difficult it should be for it to prevail. A
manufacturer with a large market share has the ability to foreclose a greater number of
distribution outlets from its competitors. Moreover, such a manufacturer would have
less need to use an exclusive dealing arrangement to enhance its ability to compete
against other brands. Such a manufacturer would have a heavier burden in rebutting a
plaintiffs prima facie proof of illegality.
It might be possible, however, for manufacturers with large, but declining, market
shares to prove the legality of an exclusive dealing arrangement. Consider a
requirement by General Motors that its dealers buy automobiles only from it and not
from its rivals. In rebutting a plaintiffs case attacking the exclusive dealing
arrangement, General Motors could demonstrate that the landscape of the U.S.
automotive market has changed dramatically in the last two decades, "from a cozy,
three-way oligopoly... [among Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler] to a knife fight
among six to eight global players., 21 6 General Motors's share of the domestic
automobile market has declined from 46 % in the 1950s to 25.6% in 2004, as foreign
manufacturers such as Toyota and Honda have increased their own market share.
217
214. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 1005 (N.D.
Cal. 1979) (holding that IBM did not violate section 2 by tying its computer central processing
unit to its peripheral devices, because the combination resulted in an improved design), affid
sub nom. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983).
215. Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing
and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 29 (1981).
216. Joseph B. White & Jeffrey McCracken, Troubled Legacy: How US. Auto Industry
Finds Itself Stalled by Its Own History, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2006, at Al.
217. See Gregg Easterbrook, What's Bad for G.M Is.... N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, at
WK1 (describing GM's forty-six percent share of the domestic automobile market in the 1950s
and stating that "Toyota is on pace to pass [GM] as the world's No. 1 automaker"); Lee
Hawkins, Jr., Neal E. Boudette & Kris Maher, Wielding the Ax: GM, Amid Industry Overhaul,
Cuts Health Benefits for Retirees, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2005, at AI (describing GM's current
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General Motors could argue that it should be allowed to require its dealers to purchase
automobiles exclusively from it so that it could compete more effectively against such
foreign rivals.
It should be difficult for a defendant to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case against an
exclusive dealing arrangement involving suppliers. A firm with market power can
substantially harm its rivals by tying up critical sources of supply in the relevant
market. Ford, for example, has accused Toyota of attempting to control the key
suppliers of components for hybrid engines, in order to prevent Ford and other
automobile companies from obtaining the components they need to manufacture their
own hybrids.218 Such actions could limit innovation in the hybrid engine market and
deprive consumers of alternative sources of more fuel-efficient automobiles. Toyota
could only prevail in an antitrust action by Ford if it could demonstrate that its
exclusive dealing arrangements with suppliers of hybrid components had a legitimate
efficiency justification, such as assuring Toyota of an adequate supply of scarce
components for its hybrid engines.
B. Monopoly Cases
In monopoly cases, the plaintiff should have the burden of proving both that the
defendant possesses monopoly power and that it has misused its monopoly power in
some manner. If the plaintiff meets its burden of proof, the defendant should have an
opportunity to rebut by proving that it had a legitimate business justification for the
conduct at issue.
1. The Plaintiff's Burden of Proof
Most courts and agencies have equated monopoly power with a market share in
excess of seventy percent. Such firms usually have the power to raise prices
unilaterally and to establish the standards for service, quality, and innovation in the
relevant market.2 19 In cases brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff
should have the initial burden of proving that the defendant possesses the requisite
market share of 25.6%).
218. See Norihiko Shirouzu & Jathon Sapsford, Power Struggle: As Hybrid Cars Gain
Traction, Industry Battles Over Designs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2005, at Al (referring to
statement by Ford spokesperson that "Toyota is trying to squeeze the supply of components"
used in hybrid engines).
219. See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 379, 391 (1956)
(inferring monopoly power from seventy-five percent market share); Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 694 n.18 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[To establish]
monopoly power, lower courts generally require a minimum market share of between 70% and
80%."); Exxon Corp. v. Berwick Bay Real Estate Partners, 748 F.2d 937, 940 (5th Cir. 1984)
("[M]onopolization is rarely found when the defendant's share of the relevant market is below
70%."); Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964,981 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting
that seventy-one to seventy-six percent market share supports inference); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that ninety percent market
share supports inference); Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 730 F. Supp.
826, 902 (C.D. Il. 1990) ("Where the record reveals a market share of 70 to 80%, courts have
simply inferred the existence of monopoly power without specifically examining ... control
over prices [or] competition.... ."), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1991).
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monopoly power. A court or an agency should dismiss any section 2 case in which the
plaintiff fails to prove that the defendant controls at least seventy percent of the
relevant market. However, proving a defendant's mere possession of monopoly power
should not suffice to prove a section 2 violation. A plaintiff should also have to make
out a prima facie case that a defendant has misused its monopoly power to exclude
actual or potential rivals from the market.
Placing this additional burden of proof on the plaintiff is necessary because firms
should not be punished simply for obtaining monopoly power.22 ° Consumers benefit
when firms fight aggressively to enhance their market power. Monopolies often
represent the triumph of the most efficient firm in the relevant market. Firms usually
obtain the greatest share of a particular market because they have provided consumers
with the best products at the lowest possible prices. As a recent Wall Street Journal
editorial said of Wal-Mart, "You don't sell $300 billion a year worth of anything
without doing something right."
221
Consider the reasons for Microsoft's 90 percent share of the market for personal
computer operating systems.2 22 Many observers argue that Microsoft gained its
monopoly power because its "Windows" operating system was the most efficient, cost-
effective product in the market.223 One commentator recently opined, "[N]o company
anywhere has done more to put high-quality software into more people's hands."
224
220. As one commentator recently explained, "The innovative firm that invents the better
mousetrap may harm its rivals, but at the same time, also does society a great service. The
injured rival that bums down the innovator's factory or slanders its product does not. A
defensible definition of 'monopolize' would presumably distinguish between the two." Alan J.
Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN. L. REv. 743, 744
(2005). The Supreme Court has consistently recognized, since 1904, that monopoly power itself
should not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act. See United States v. U.S. Steel Co., 251 U.S.
417, 449-50 (1920); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62, 75-77 (1911); N. Sec.
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). In Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S.
398 (2004), the Court refused to find a monopoly telephone company liable under section 2 for
denying a rival access to its telephone network.. The Court emphasized that the pursuit of
"monopoly prices.., is an important element of the free-market system.... [It] is what attracts
'business acumen' in the first place .... Id. at 407.
221. Editorial, Is Wal-Mart Good for America?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2005, at A1O.
222. Steve Lohr, Can This Man Reprogram Microsoft?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at BU4.
223. See, e.g., Ben Heskett & Michael Kanellos, Ballmer: MS is the American Way, CNET
NEWS.coM, Dec. 5, 1997, http://news.com.com/Ballmer+MS+is+the+American+way/2 100- 10
23_3-206065.html ("'I think what we're doing is right, lawful, moral, proper, and competitive. I
might even say it's the American way. We're innovating, adding value, driving down prices,
competing, serving our customers, and we're doing it well. A lot of other companies in the
United States are benefiting because they're building on top of our platform and thriving. I
might start playing the "Star-Spangled Banner" if I went on too long."' (quoting Steve Ballmer,
Executive Vice President of Microsoft Corp.)).
224. Lee Gomes, Microsoft Complains About Complacency, But Who Is at Fault?, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 22, 2003, at B 1. Some commentators, in fact, argue that Windows constitutes a"natural
monopoly," due to the fact that consumers prefer the ease of using a single standard for all
personal computer applications programs. See David Balto & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and
High-Tech Industries: The New Challenge, 43 ANTrrRUsT BuLL. 583, 604 (1998) ("In industries
characterized by networks, even monopoly is seen by some observers as inevitable and merely
an accommodation to consumer demand for a compatible technical standard.").
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Although firms should be permitted to obtain monopoly power through superior
efficiency, their conduct should be more closely regulated after they have achieved
such power. Because of their market power, monopolists have an enhanced ability to
affect consumers, either for good or for ill. As the Supreme Court emphasized in the
1932 case United States v. Swift & Co., "[S]ize carries with it an opportunity for abuse
that is not to be ignored., 225 Because of their ability to control the relevant market,
monopolists often can perpetuate or extend their monopoly power for reasons unrelated
to the quality of their products or services.
The courts have held that certain conduct that would be perfectly permissible for a
firm with a small market share can be illegal when undertaken by a monopolist.226 The
courts have been unable, however, to establish a consistent dividing line between
monopolists' permissible and illegal conduct. For example, although tying and
exclusive dealing arrangements have similar competitive effects, the courts have
treated monopolists' tying arrangements more severely.227 Because it lacks a valid
economic basis, the courts' current approach to monopoly conduct has confused
practitioners and business executives as to the applicable standards of behavior for
firms with large market shares.228 The courts and agencies should more clearly define
how a plaintiff can meet its burden of proving wrongful acts by monopolists in section
2 cases. Conduct should be illegal under section 2 if it is contrary to a monopolist's
legitimate self-interest in enhancing its efficiency and "makes no economic sense other
than as a means of perpetuating or extending monopoly power." 229 Such a standard
would preclude conduct harmful to consumers without deterring monopolists from
improving their products and services. When monopolists intentionally incur losses
that are contrary to their immediate self-interest, it is reasonable to assume that they
anticipate a long-term benefit that will outweigh such losses. Such benefit usually
results from the maintenance or extension of a monopolist's market power. Consumers
are harmed in such cases, because, instead of competing aggressively on the merits,
monopolists refrain from competition in order to obtain the long-term benefits of
enhanced market power.
Consider the most common types of monopolistic conduct: access restrictions,
tying, exclusive dealing, predatory pricing, and fraudulent trade practices such as false
product pre-announcements and sham litigation. Each of these acts appears irrational
225. 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932).
226. See supra notes 85-86, 92, 98-100 and accompanying text.
227. See Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists, supra note 85, at 836; supra notes 94-100 and
accompanying text.
228. See Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 833-44 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
Recognizing the lack of clear standards in monopolization cases, the FTC and DOJ planned
hearings for early 2006 to recommend better means of determining "when specific types of
single-firm conduct are pro-competitive or benign, and when they may harm consumers."
Hearings To Focus on Antitrust Implications ofSingle-Firm Conduct, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
No. 919, at 1 (Dec. 1, 2005).
229. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists, supra note 85, at 845; see also John E. Lopatka &
William H. Page, Bargaining and Monopolization: In Search of the "Boundary of Section 2
Liability" Between Aspen and Trinko, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 115, 122 (2005) ("If it makes no sense
for a rational firm to adopt the practice other than as a means of enhancing monopoly power, it
is more likely to be characterized as unlawfully exclusionary.").
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on its face because it is likely to inflict immediate losses upon a monopolist. Access
restrictions limit the potential market for a monopolist's products or services. Tying
arrangements generate ill will with customers who are forced to purchase unwanted
products.230 Exclusive dealing arrangements waste bargaining leverage that a
monopolist could have used to obtain concessions on price, delivery, and other terms
of sale from its customers and suppliers. Predatory pricing requires a monopolist to
forego profits on each product that it sells. A monopolist alienates its customers and
wastes its own resources when it makes false announcements about future products or
pursues baseless litigation.
No firm, however, intentionally engages in conduct that will harm it in the
marketplace. There must be an explanation for monopolists' willingness to incur losses
in implementing access restrictions, tying and exclusive dealing arrangements,
predatory pricing, or fraudulent trade practices. A firm would not want to forego
profits, irritate its customers, reduce its sales, or waste scarce resources unless it
perceived a payback that compensated for such losses. In the case of a monopolist, the
payback often comes from its ability to exclude competitors that might threaten its
monopoly position in its current market or in a new market to which it is attempting to
extend its monopoly power. 23' For example, when Microsoft designs its Windows
operating system in a way that makes it difficult for competitors' word-processing,
Internet-access, or other applications programs to run on the system, Microsoft is
acting against its own legitimate self-interest in making Windows a universal platform
for all related applications. In such a case, a court or enforcement agency can assume
that Microsoft's only purpose is to extend its monopoly power from the operating-
systems market to various applications markets.
232
2. The Defendant's Rebuttal Case
Once the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant possesses monopoly power and
has used that power in a manner that appears to be contrary to its legitimate economic
interest, the burden should shift to the defendant to demonstrate that it actually had a
legitimate business justification for the conduct at issue. Shifting the burden to the
230. In Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536, 549 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth
Circuit pointed out the usual lack of any economic rationale for such conduct: "Every time the
monopolist asserts its market dominance on a firm in the leveraged market, the leveraged firm
has more incentive to find an alternative supplier ......
231. Some courts have inferred a section 2 violation when monopolists have incurred short-
term costs in order to drive a rival from the market. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608-11 (1985) (pointing out that "jury may well have concluded
that [defendant] elected to forego ... short-run benefits" in refusing to deal with plaintiff and
that evidence supported inference that defendant was "willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and
consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival"); Advanced
Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 148 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[If a plaintiff
shows that a defendant has harmed consumers and competition by making a short-term sacrifice
in order to further its exclusive, anti-competitive objectives, it has shown predation by that
defendant.").
232. See Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists, supra note 85, at 852-55 (describing ways in
which Microsoft can misuse its monopoly power).
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monopolist to prove a benign intent for its conduct is fair because the monopolist is the
party with access to the evidence that will prove its legitimate competitive purpose.
Documentary evidence should be particularly helpful in establishing a monopolist's
intent. Most large corporations engage in considerable strategic planning concerning
their competitors. Formal strategic plans, memoranda, e-mail and other internal
correspondence, and minutes of meetings often will reveal a monopolist's purpose for a
particular course of conduct.
233
Monopolists' tying arrangements, access restrictions, below-market pricing, product
pre-announcements, and litigation practices all may have a legitimate purpose. Such
conduct may be designed not to drive rivals from the market but to preserve
efficiencies beneficial to consumers. An ostensible tying arrangement may actually be
intended to insure the effective functioning of integrated products.234 Although some
commentators have claimed that Microsoft has tied features such as its Web browser
and word-processing system into its Windows operating system for anticompetitive
purposes, 235 Microsoft has actually improved the functionality of its operating system
by providing a seamless means by which users can move back and forth among various
applications. 6
An access restriction may be designed to insure that a third party is qualified to use
a monopolist's resources. For example, Microsoft may be able to prove that the
interfaces to its operating system were designed, not to exclude competing applications
programs, but to insure the efficient operation of its Windows program. Similarly, a
monopolist's low prices may simply reflect a lower cost structure resulting from its
economies of scale and may not require a monopolist to incur any short-term losses at237
all. Pre-announcements by monopolists of legitimate product improvements may be
intended to assist consumers in planning their future purchases.2 3' Finally, litigation by
233. See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases, and
the Transformation of the Law, 60 TEx. L. REv. 587, 634 (1982) ("The end products of
corporate strategic planning can provide solid evidence of corporate intent .... ).
234. The courts have upheld tying arrangements designed to integrate separate components
necessary for the effective functioning of a product. See supra note 207.
235. See, e.g., Lohr, supra note 222 ("Microsoft has bundled outstanding programs with
mediocre ones, and all of them typically become the industry standards.").
236. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 55 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of
fact) ("[Clonsumers can be said to benefit from Microsoft's provision of Web browsing
functionality with its Windows operating system at no additional charge."); Ronald A. Cass, The
Terms of Trade: Antitrust a la Carte, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16,2005, at Al 8 ("Years ago, Microsoft
combined its more cumbersome, less user-friendly DOS program with an optical interface
program to create Windows. It has been adding features... and expanding what its operating
system does ever since. Consumers have approved that approach to product evolution.").
237. Since discount pricing is so beneficial to consumers, a monopolist should not be liable
for any sales made at prices above its marginal costs. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner,
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv.
697, 711-12 (1975) (concluding that sales by monopolist should be legal if made at prices equal
to or above marginal cost and illegal if made at prices below marginal cost).
238. See Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists, supra note 85, at 877 ("Consumers generally
benefit from pre-announcements because they provide valuable information about forthcoming
products.").
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a monopolist against its competitors may have the legitimate purpose of protecting its
intellectual property rights.
239
A monopolist should not, however, be able to meet its burden of proving a
legitimate justification for an exclusive dealing arrangement. In a competitive market, a
firm may have legitimate reasons for requiring its customers and suppliers to deal
exclusively with it and not with its competitors. For example, exclusive dealing
contracts with customers may force a reseller to concentrate on promoting the seller's
products and prevent it from giving rivals a free ride on the seller's promotional
efforts.2 ° Such rationale, however, do not apply to monopolists. Since a monopolist's
products are, by definition, already dominant in the relevant market, it need not require
its resellers to focus their efforts exclusively on its products. Furthermore, a monopolist
incurs short-term costs when it imposes exclusive dealing arrangements on its
customers or suppliers. Such agreements reduce a monopolist's reservoir of goodwill
with its customers and suppliers and use up leverage with which a monopolist could
have pursued concessions on price, delivery, and other terms of sale. A monopolist
would risk incurring such short-term costs only if it believed that in the long run, it
could benefit by making it more difficult for potential rivals to access the customer or
supplier outlets necessary to survive in the relevant market. Since exclusive dealing
arrangements raise the already-high barriers to entry in monopoly markets, the courts
and agencies should preclude monopolists from entering into such arrangements with
any customer or supplier.
C. Horizontal Mergers
In horizontal merger cases, the plaintiff should have the initial burden of proving
that the parties to the merger have a collective market share in excess of a particular
threshold. If the plaintiff meets its burden of proof, the parties to the merger should
have an opportunity to rebut by proving that factors such as ease of entry, lack of
unilateral or coordinated effects, and efficiencies will eliminate or mitigate the
potential adverse competitive effects of the merger.
1. The Plaintiff's Burden of Proof
The plaintiff should have the initial burden of proving the market power of the
parties in merger cases brought under section 7 of the Clayton Act. By considering the
parties' market power at the first stage of their analysis, the courts and agencies can
confirm the legality of many mergers without any further inquiry.
The courts and agencies should create safe harbors of legality for mergers that
create entities that have up to a thirty percent market share. Such transactions do not
have the potential to generate any real anticompetitive effects. In such cases, there is no
239. See id. at 878-79 ("In most cases monopolists have legitimate reasons to assert their
regulatory and intellectual property rights.").
240. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) (preventing free
riding mayjustify certain restraints placed by a seller on its customers); Joyce Beverages, Inc. v.
Royal Crown Cola Co., 555 F. Supp. 271, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[Exclusive dealing] insures
that the [retailer] devotes undivided loyalty to its particular brand and that it competes
vigorously against all competing brands.").
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need for the courts to consider any mitigating factors, such as ease of entry or the
potential for efficiencies. The Merger Guidelines of the DOJ and FTC recognize that
"[m]ergers that... do not significantly increase concentration... ordinarily require no
further analysis." 241 Neither unilateral nor coordinated effects should be a concern
when the parties to a merger collectively control less than thirty percent of the relevant
market. 242 Thus, plaintiffs should not be able to meet their initial burden of proof
unless they can demonstrate that the parties to the merger had a collective market share
in excess of thirty percent.
243
If the plaintiff meets its burden of proving a merger above the thirty percent
threshold, the burden should shift to the defendant to demonstrate that the merger will
not have substantial anticompetitive effects. The relative burden imposed on a
defendant should vary according to the market shares proven by a plaintiff. The
presumption of illegality should be relatively weak when the collective market shares
of the parties to a merger are less than fifty percent. In such a case, it should be easier
for a defendant to rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the merger is unlikely to
cause anticompetitive effects. A plaintiff can strengthen its case against mergers below
the fifty percent market share level by proving that the merger raises the risk of
coordinated anticompetitive effects.
A transaction may not give the merged entity enough market power to raise prices,
to reduce output, or to engage in other anticompetitive conduct on its own, but it may
reduce the number of firms in the market to a point at which the remaining players can
exercise oligopoly power. "Firms are more likely to be able to coordinate their conduct
to exercise such power when the products in the relevant market are homogeneous,
transactions are frequent, pricing is standardized, information on the pricing and output
strategies of rivals is easily accessible, or customers are insensitive to price
changes.' '244 When two or more of such factors are present, the elimination of a single
player may make coordinated action more likely, even when the merged entity holds
considerably less than 50 percent of the relevant market.
In the U.S. airline industry, for example, carriers can easily coordinate their pricing
because fares change frequently and are publicly posted on computer reservation
systems and Internet sites. Indeed, the airlines have been accused of using their
241. Merger Guidelines, supra note 69, 13,104, at 20,571.
242. For example, the DOJ and FTC 1996 Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in
Health Care, establish an "antitrust safety zone" for joint purchasing arrangements among
health care providers where "the purchases account for less than 35 percent of the total sales of
the purchased product or service in the relevant market." 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,153, at
20,812 (Sept. 5, 1996).
243. In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the Supreme Court concluded that a
presumption of illegality should apply whenever a merged entity's market share reaches thirty
percent or more. 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963) ("Without attempting to specify the smallest market
share which would still be considered to threaten undue concentration, we are clear that 30%
represents that threat."). Subsequent Supreme Court cases reduced that threshold to twenty-five
percent. See United States v. Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461-66 (1964) (finding that a
merged company with twenty-five percent market share violated section 7); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 277-80 (1964) (holding that a merged company with
twenty-nine percent of the market violated section 7).
244. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A New Approach to the Antitrust Analysis of Mergers, 83 B.U.
L. REv. 785, 820 (2003) [hereinafter Piraino, Jr., Mergers].
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computer reservations systems and Internet sites to signal pricing decisions to each
other.245 Thus, the courts and agencies might preclude airline mergers in which the
merged entity holds less than fifty percent of the market.
It should be difficult for parties to a merger to rebut the presumption of illegality
when they collectively control more than fifty percent of the relevant market. Indeed, if
the plaintiff proves a market share of seventy percent or more, the transaction should
be considered a merger to monopoly, and the presumption of illegality should become
irrebuttable. No mitigating factors should save such transactions from illegality.
Although firms should be permitted-and indeed encouraged-to obtain monopoly
power through internal growth generated by superior products and services,246 they
should not be allowed to obtain monopolies by acquisition. Mergers to monopoly are
not the result of consumer demand for a better product but simply the result of a
potential monopolist's ability to pay the highest price to purchase its rivals. As one
commentator has explained, "[A] merger to monopoly.., should not be subject to an
efficiencies justification because of the serious exploitative risk from such a high
degree of market power., 247 The illegality of such mergers is consistent with the
language of section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits without exception any
mergers that "tend to create a monopoly. ' '248 Thus, the courts should preclude, without
any further inquiry, any mergers that would give the resulting entity a market share in
excess of seventy percent of the relevant market.
2 49
2. The Defendant's Rebuttal Case
a. Ease of Entry
Proving ease of entry should be a defendant's most effective means of rebutting a
plaintiff's proof of market power because entry conditions have the potential to
245. See United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,687
(D.D.C. 1994) (authorizing consent agreement involving alleged price signaling among airlines
in computerized fare publication venture); Marilyn Geewax, Orbitz Ready for Launch,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 28, 2001, at I C (noting the concern of Thomas Underwood, an
online travel industry analyst, that the Orbitz online ticketing joint venture among airlines
"permits price signaling and allows instant competitive response").
246. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,430 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand,
J.) ("The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when
he wins.").
247. Joseph F. Brodley, Proof of Efficiencies in Mergers and Joint Ventures, 64 ANTrrITRUST
L.J. 575, 587 (1996). The courts generally have denied an efficiencies defense in cases of
mergers to monopoly. See FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(granting an injunction against a merger between the only two hospitals in the relevant market),
rev'd, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997)
(granting an injunction against a merger among office supply companies that operated the only
two "superstores" in several local markets).
248. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
249. Cf Robert Pitofsky, Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers: Two Years After, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 485, 492 (1999) ("When two firms, as a result of merger, will account for as
much as 80% of a properly defined relevant market[,] ... efficiency claims.., should not
usually reverse a finding of illegality.").
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eliminate entirely the adverse competitive effects of a merger. In markets in which
entry is relatively easy, neither coordinated nor unilateral anticompetitive effects are
likely to occur, even if the parties hold a large collective market share. Neither the
merged entity acting alone nor the remaining competitors acting collectively will be
able to raise prices, to limit output, or to otherwise restrict competition for any
meaningful period if other firms are likely to enter the market in response to such
anticompetitive conduct.250
If a defendant meets its burden of proving that entry into the relevant market is easy,
courts and agencies should approve the merger without further inquiry. As the Merger
Guidelines point out, where ease of entry exists, "[T]he merger raises no antitrust
concern and ordinarily requires no further analysis., 251 For example, the capital costs
of entering the dry cleaning business are not excessive. If two of the three dry cleaners
in a community merged and thereafter attempted to raise prices, it is likely that one or
more other firms would be induced to enter the market quickly, thus making the price
increase unsuccessful. Such mergers do not have any ongoing adverse effect on
consumers, and courts and agencies need not engage in an analysis of other mitigating
factors in order to uphold them.
b. Proof of Lack of Unilateral or Coordinated Effects
A defendant may rebut a plaintiffs prima facie case against a merger by
demonstrating that the transaction does not increase the likelihood that competition will
be reduced either by coordinated activity among the remaining firms in the market or
by the merged entity acting on its own. Even when a merger occurs among firms in a
concentrated oligopoly market, a defendant may be able to prove that, due to certain
characteristics of the relevant market, the remaining firms will not be able to
coordinate their conduct to restrict competition. Coordination among oligopolists is
less likely when competing products have distinct characteristics and prices vary
accordingly. Consider the market for turbine engines used in electric power plants. It
would be difficult for the manufacturers of such engines to coordinate their pricing
after a merger because each engine has unique specifications designed for a particular
application, and prices vary widely.252 Therefore, a merger of two turbine engine
manufacturers should not unduly harm consumers, even in relatively concentrated
markets.
250. As two antitrust commentators have explained, "The ultimate issue is whether entry is
so easy that it 'would likely avert [the] anti-competitive effects' resulting from the proposed
acquisition." Richard G. Parker & David A. Balto, The Merger Wave: Trends in Merger
Enforcement and Litigation, 55 Bus. LAW. 351, 361 (1999) (quoting Staples, 970 F. Supp. at
1086). The Merger Guidelines state that "A merger is not likely to create or enhance market
power or to facilitate its exercise, if entry into the market is so easy that market participants,
after the merger, either collectively or unilaterally could not profitably maintain a price increase
above premerger levels." Merger Guidelines, supra note 69, 13,104, at 20,573-9.
251. Merger Guidelines, supra note 69, 13,104, at 20,573-10.
252. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Lowell Bergman, Judge Says Supplier Inflated Gas Prices
in California Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at AI (describing "gas-fired turbines" used in
electric power plants).
[Vol. 82:345
A NEWANTITRUSTAPPROACH
A defendant could also make various arguments against the adverse unilateral
effects of a horizontal merger. A defendant should have a particularly strong rebuttal
argument on unilateral effects when the collective market share of the parties to a
merger is less than fifty percent. Firms that control less than fifty percent of the output
in the relevant market should not be able to act alone to raise prices, to reduce output,
or to engage in other conduct harmful to consumers. If a firm with less than fifty
percent of a market attempted to raise prices above the competitive level, other firms
would likely hold prices at the competitive level-diverting business and making the
price increase ultimately unsuccessful. As a firm's market share exceeds fifty percent,
however, it becomes increasingly able to engage in unilateral anticompetitive
conduct.
253
In order to approve a merger that would confer market power above the fifty
percent threshold, a court or agency would have to be convinced that certain unique
market factors made the exercise of unilateral market power unlikely. For example, in
certain markets, buyers may be powerful enough to prevent a merged entity from
raising prices even if it has substantial market power. As one commentator has
explained, "[T]he power of customers to push down price.., can be just as important.
.as the number ... of competitors in the market." 254 In certain cases, a reduction of
firms from four to three, or even from three to two, may not harm consumers at all.255
In 1997, the FTC approved Boeing's merger with McDonnell Douglas, which gave
Boeing more than fifty percent of the worldwide airplane manufacturing market and
left only Airbus to compete with Boeing in the manufacture of commercial aircraft.
256
Despite this duopoly, airlines have had sufficient bargaining power to win significant
price concessions from the two companies.257 The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger
253. See Robert H. Lande & James Langenfeld, From Surrogates to Stories: The Evolution
ofFederal Merger Policy, ANTrrRUST, Spring 1997, at 5, 8 (describing the approach of antitrust
regulators to mergers resulting in thirty-five to fifty pecent market share).
254. Michael E. Porter, Competition andAntitrust: Toward a Productivity-BasedApproach
to Evaluating Mergers and Joint Ventures, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 919,937 (2001). Some courts
have found that buyers have sufficient leverage to counteract the anticompetitive effects of
proposed mergers. See FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 60 (D.D.C. 1998)
(finding that customers of drug wholesalers "possess a significant amount of leverage in contract
negotiations"); United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1416 (S.D.
Iowa 1991) ("The existence of large, powerful buyers... mitigates against the ability of sellers
to raise prices."); United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 986 (D.D.C. 1990) ("[Tlhe
sophistication [of the defendant's customers] was likely to promote competition even in a highly
concentrated market.").
255. But see Thomas B. Leary, An Inside Look at the Heinz Case, ANTITRUST, Spring 2002,
at 32, 32 ("[T]here is a broad consensus in the economic community that... 3-2 combinations
are likely to be particularly troublesome.").
256. See In re Boeing Co., [1997-2001 FTC Complaints & Orders Transfer Binder] Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH), 24,295, at 24,123 (July 1, 1997); Amy J. Boatner, Consolidation of the
Aerospace and Defense Industries: The Effect of the Big Three Mergers in the United States
Defense Industry, 64 J. AIR L. & COM. 913,920-22 (1999) (describing the effects of the merger
between Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas).
257. J. Lynn Lunsford & Daniel Michaels, KLMto Order Planes from Both Boeing, Airbus,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2002, at A2 (describing "an all-out (pricing] war" between the two
companies to obtain new airplane orders).
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has actually been advantageous for consumers. Airlines have benefited from their
suppliers' economies of scale, which allow them to invest in improved airplane models,
such as the new fuel-efficient aircraft under development at Boeing and the new wide-
body plane being manufactured by Airbus.2"
c. Proof of Efficiencies
The parties to a merger may also rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case by
demonstrating that the potential efficiencies of the transaction outweigh its
anticompetitive effects. There is currently no consensus among antitrust commentators
and regulators as to whether efficiencies can ever justify mergers that substantially
increase concentration levels in a particular market, and no federal court has yet been
willing to concede that efficiencies can outweigh the anticompetitive effects of a
merger.
259
Efficiencies do, however, have their place in merger analysis. Efficiencies should
not be as decisive in the analysis of mergers as ease of entry or factors bearing on the
likelihood of coordinated or unilateral effects. If a defendant can prevail on such
arguments, a court or an agency can be confident that a merger will not have adverse
competitive effects. By contrast, efficiencies do not eliminate or mitigate a merger's
anticompetitive effects; they simply provide a countervailing benefit that courts and
agencies should balance against the transaction's adverse effects on consumers.
Antitrust regulators have struggled for years to determine how to balance the
potential efficiencies of a merger against its potential anticompetitive effects. 26 0 Courts
and agencies can clarify the balancing test by ranking efficiencies in the order of their
importance. The critical issue is whether a merger has the potential to leave consumers
better off than they would have been if the parties had never combined. Efficiencies
should be weighed in the balancing analysis according to their likelihood of being
legitimate, realizable, beneficial to consumers, and unattainable other than through the
proposed merger. Under these criteria, efficiencies should be recognized in the
following order: (1) cost savings, (2) synergies resulting from the combination of
258. Id; see also Edward Wong, Boeing Drops PlansforHigh-SpeedAirplane, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2002, at C2. Several courts and commentators, however, believe that an efficiencies
defense is not appropriate for mergers that leave only two dominant firms in the relevant market.
See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that a merger that
would reduce the number of baby food producers from three to two would be found illegal);
Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (holding that a merger that would reduce the number of
national pharmaceutical wholesalers from four to two would likely be illegal); Yochi J. Dreazen,
Greg Ip & Nicholas Kulish, Why the Sudden Rise in the Urge to Merge and Form Oligopolies?,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2002, at Al ('"Twenty [competitors] to four is good .... It's four to two
that is much more dubious."' (quoting Carl Shapiro, Professor, University of California-
Berkeley)).
259. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Robert Pitofsky has suggested that the
efficiencies defense should not be permitted for mergers leading to a single firm market share of
thirty-five percent or more. Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger
Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 218 (1992). "In the European Community
the cutoff for an efficiencies-justified merger is a market share of 40-45 percent ... " Brodley,
supra note 247, at 588.
260. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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complementary assets, (3) economies of scale, and (4) the resolution of imbalances
between supply and demand. The higher-ranked efficiencies (cost savings and
synergies) should justify mergers effecting concentration levels of up to fifty percent,
while the lower-ranked efficiencies (economies of scale and resolution of capacity
imbalances) should only permit mergers in which the parties have a combined market
share of up to forty percent.
2 61
D. Horizontal Joint Ventures
Courts and agencies should balance the potential efficiencies and anticompetitive
effects of joint ventures in markets in which the joint venture partners are currently
competing. The plaintiff should have the initial burden of proving that the collective
market power of the parties to the joint venture exceeds a particular threshold. If the
plaintiff meets its burden of proof, the parties to the venture should have the
opportunity to rebut by proving the circumstances that mitigate a joint venture's
adverse effect on competition.
1. Balancing Efficiencies and Anticompetitive Effects
Under the proposed approach, the courts and enforcement agencies would be able to
determine the legality of a substantial number ofjoint ventures on their face. Indeed,
all vertical joint ventures would be entitled to a presumption of legality because, in
most cases, their only effect is beneficial.262 Thus, the courts and enforcement agencies
would only have to engage in the complex task of balancing economic efficiencies and
adverse effects when joint ventures involve products in which the partners are currently
engaged in competition.
A balancing test is appropriate for joint ventures designed to enhance their partners'
efficiencies in markets in which they are already competing. Joint ventures in existing
markets restrict competition as well as enhance efficiency. Such ventures reduce the
number of competitors in the market because the partners will refrain, in the natural
course, from competing with their own affiliate.263 The joint venture, in effect, will take
the place of its partners within the scope of its operations. Whether or not the parties
expressly agree not to compete with the joint venture, they usually will avoid
competition that could harm their own affiliate.264 For such ventures, the courts must
balance the "tradeoff between efficiency gains ... and the potential anticompetitive
losses.
26 5
261. For a more detailed discussion of the relative role of such efficiencies in merger
analysis, see generally Piraino, Jr., Mergers, supra note 244, at 822-31.
262. See supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
263. A joint venture "reduces the parents' incentive for competition because whatever a
parent might earn by making individual sales in the joint market is now offset by its lowered
profit as a partner in the joint venture." Joseph F. Brodley, Analyzing Joint Ventures with
Foreign Partners, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 76 (1984).
264. See id.
265. Thomas L. Greaney & Jody L. Sindelar, Physician-Sponsored Joint Ventures: An
Antitrust Analysis of Preferred Provider Organizations, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 571 (1987).
David Clanton has characterized the FTC's analysis of the General Motors-Toyotajoint venture
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A balancing approach is appropriate not only when a joint venture restricts existing
competition among its partners but also when it limits potential competition. Firms may
form joint ventures for the purpose of enhancing their efficiency in a new market,
which one or more of the partners could have entered on their own. Such a venture
forecloses the partners' individual entry into the relevant market. By virtue of the
partners' participation in the joint venture, other competitors will no longer perceive
them as potential entrants into the market. In making their decisions on pricing and
output, the incumbent competitors will not feel constrained by the threat of individual
entry by the joint venture partners. 2 6 Thus, the courts should balance the efficiencies
and anticompetitive effects of joint ventures that cover areas in which their partners
currently compete or, but for the joint venture, would have competed.
2. The Plaintiff's Burden of Proof
The plaintiff should have the initial burden of proving the market power of the
parties to joint ventures that restrict actual or potential competition. Substantial
reductions in research and development, production output, or price competition will
only occur when the joint venture partners collectively can exercise market power.
Thus, as part of its prima facie case, the plaintiff should be required to prove that the
partners to joint ventures in existing markets have a market share above a particular
threshold. If a plaintiff fails to meet its burden, a court or an agency should allow the
joint venture to proceed.
Because "[t]he potential for price-fixing and market domination grows as a
company moves closer to the marketplace, 267 the market share threshold should be
higher for "upstream" than for "downstream" joint ventures. Upstream joint ventures
limited to research and development, industry-standards setting, joint buying, or other
"inputs" into the production process usually do not affect the partners' decisions on
pricing and output.268 Thus, a relatively high market share threshold of 40 percent
would be appropriate for such ventures.2 69 Downstream production and marketing joint
as a balancing approach. See David A. Clanton, HorizontalAgreements, the Rule ofReason, and
the General Motors-Toyota Joint Venture, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 1239 (1984). Such an approach
was appropriate for this partially integrated joint venture that covered an area-the production
of compact cars-in which the two companies already competed.
266. The Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., that such
adverse consequences could result from ajoint venture's elimination of potential competition.
378 U.S. 158, 173-74 (1964); see also Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir.
1981) (finding illegal a joint venture between a domestic outboard motor manufacturer and a
foreign manufacturer that probably would have entered the U.S. market in the absence of the
joint venture).
267. Joel B. Eisen, Antitrust Reform for Production Joint Ventures, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 253,
263 (1990).
268. See Walter T. Winslow, Joint Ventures-Antitrust Problems and Opportunities, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 979, 983-84 (1985); Robert Pitofsky, supra note 146, at 1041-42 (1969).
269. This Article proposes a market share threshold of only 30 percent for a plaintiff's prima
facie case against mergers. The higher market share threshold for joint ventures is justified by
the fact that such transactions have less of an anticompetitive effect than mergers. See supra
notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
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ventures, however, have a greater potential for anticompetitive effects. A lower market
share threshold of thirty percent should apply to such ventures.
270
3. The Defendant's Rebuttal Case
Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of market power, a defendant should be
allowed to rebut by showing circumstances that mitigate a joint venture's adverse
effect on competition. Because joint ventures are less anticompetitive than mergers,27'
it should be easier for a defendant to meet its rebuttal burden in joint venture cases than
in merger cases. Even if the parties have a large collective market share, the joint
venture will not have a significant adverse effect if it is of limited scope and duration.
In joint ventures limited to a short term, the parties will be acutely aware that their self-
interest lies in maintaining their individual competitive capacities. If the venture covers
only an upstream phase of the production cycle, the parties will retain their incentive to
compete in the production and marketing phases. The "Big Three" automobile
companies, for example, have entered into several research and development consortia
for such products as an electric car, pollution control equipment, safety devices, and
lightweight materials to replace steel in automobiles.272 These consortia have not
prevented Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler from competing just as fiercely against
each other in the production and sale of automobiles.
A defendant can also rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case by proving that the
efficiencies of a joint venture are likely to outweigh its anticompetitive effects.
Traditionally, courts have given little weight to efficiency defenses in merger and joint
venture analysis, believing that such arguments are easy to assert but difficult to
confirm.273
Courts should have no trouble, however, distinguishing genuine from sham
efficiency arguments in favor of a joint venture. First of all, the defendant, who will
have access to the relevant documents and witnesses, will have the burden ofproving a
legitimate efficiency justification. Furthermore, efficiencies are easier to confirm in
joint venture cases than in merger cases. The efficiencies likely to result from a
particular joint venture often will be evident from the degree to which the venture
270. In the vertical restraints area, "[T]he courts appear to be converging on a definition of
safe harbor for firms possessing less than a 20-25% market share in a relevant market." Thomas
M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 45
(1989).
271. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
272. See Oscar Suris, Big Three Win Joint Patent, Marking a First, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13,
1993, at BI; Christopher Jensen, Big 3 Work Together on Research, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,
Feb. 28, 1993, at 1E.
273. See Pitofsky, supra note 81, at 221-22; Joseph Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger
Analysis, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 514 (1994) ("The problem of proof is the principal reason
why, in an antitrust era that has been quite hospitable to efficiencies claims in a wide variety of
other contexts, efficiencies have yet to play an outcome-determinative role in any litigated
merger case."). The Merger Guidelines, which do not give efficiencies a high status in merger
analysis, provide: "[E]fficiencies do not constitute a defense to an otherwise anticompetitive
merger but are one of many factors that will be considered by the Department in determining
whether to challenge a merger." Merger Guidelines, supra note 69, 13,103, at 20,554.
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integrates the parties' resources. Robert Pitofsky has pointed out that "the assumption
that higher levels of integration are likely to be associated with more substantial
efficiencies.... is a premise underlying all of antitrust.
' 274
The amount of integration present in a joint venture is an objective standard from
which the courts easily should be able to infer the most probable efficiencies of ajoint
venture. If the partners contribute substantial technology, assets, or capital and share
the risks of a joint venture's success or failure, they are likely to create a new
competitive entity with capacities beyond those of the individual partners. Research
and development joint ventures, for example, are more likely to achieve technical
advances when the partners are willing to share freely all of their relevant proprietary
know-how with the venture. Production joint ventures are most efficient when the
partners invest significant amounts of their own capital to improve the production
process. Marketing joint ventures benefit consumers if the partners combine their sales
networks to enhance point-of-sale services.
Conversely, when partners contribute little to joint ventures, they are more likely
acting for their own competitive benefit rather than to enhance general economic
efficiency. An agreement by purchasers to pool their bargaining power or a joint
marketing agreement among competing sellers, unaccompanied by any other efforts at
integration, may very well enhance the profitability of individual partners. These
arrangements, however, are not likely to create substantial overall efficiencies in the
relevant market.
Substantially integrated joint ventures of limited scope and duration should easily
pass muster under the balancing test. Such arrangements generate significant
efficiencies and have minimal anticompetitive effects, even when the parties have large
market shares. The FTC's analysis of a 1984 joint venture between Toyota and General
Motors is instructive. The joint venture involved the production of a compact car at a
plant in Fremont, California. 275 The FTC recognized that such a downstream venture
between what were then the first- and third-largest automobile manufacturers in the
world could have an adverse effect on competition.276 However, the FTC also pointed
out that such effects would be limited because the venture only covered the production
of a single automobile and the parties were free to continue to compete in the
marketing phase.277 Furthermore, any adverse competitive effects would be outweighed
by the efficiencies that could result from the parties' integration of their production
capacity.27 8 The FTC emphasized in particular that General Motors would have the
opportunity to learn more efficient Japanese manufacturing techniques.
279
274. Pitofsky, supra note 140, at 1623.
275. In re General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984).
276. Id. at 386-88.
277. See id. at 386.
278. Id. at 387-88.
279. Id. This assumption has been borne out by later events, for General Motors has assigned
alumni of the joint venture to oversee changes in manufacturing techniques at many of its plants.
See Paul Ingrassia & Joseph B. White, Major Overhaul: Determined to Change, General
Motors is Said to Pick New Chairman, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1992, at Al.
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CONCLUSION
Both the Harvard School and the Chicago School have made valuable contributions
to antitrust analysis. Unfortunately, the ideological battle between the two theories has
polarized antitrust thinking not only within the academic community but also among
the federal courts and enforcement agencies. The Chicago School approach was
adopted by the courts and agencies to redress the harsh approach of the Harvard
School, which often invalidated conduct that had the potential to enhance firms'
efficiency and thereby benefit consumers. However, the Chicago School had its own
excesses. By mandating a complicated empirical analysis of the economic efforts of
most competitive conduct, the Chicago School approach made the outcome of antitrust
cases more difficult to predict. As a result, antitrust enforcement lost much of its
deterrent effect. Antitrust practitioners were no longer able to advise their clients with
certainty of conduct that would be permitted or precluded.
The Supreme Court's 1999 decision in California Dental holds the promise for
healing the divide between the Harvard School and the Chicago School. By adopting
the continuum-based approach proposed in that case, the courts and agencies can retain
both the clarity of the Harvard School and the economic sophistication of the Chicago
School.
This Article has proposed a means of arraying all competitive conduct on a
continuum according to its likely effect on consumers. Under the proposed approach,
the courts and agencies will be able to confirm the consumer welfare effect of most
types of conduct in an abbreviated fashion without considering complex economic
issues. The courts and agencies will only have to engage in a more detailed market
analysis in those rare cases in which the effect of conduct on consumers is not readily
apparent. Even in such cases, the approach proposed in this Article will allow the
courts and agencies to limit their inquiry to a few decisive factors.
Under the proposed approach, judges and juries will have objective guidelines for
making decisions and will not have to engage in economic inquiries that are beyond
their competence. As a result, the outcome of antitrust cases will again become easier
to predict. Business executives will be able to plan their conduct accordingly, and the
antitrust laws will regain their deterrent effect. This approach will clarify the standards
of competition for American business, insuring that firms avoid conduct harmful to
consumers and pursue conduct with the potential to promote consumer welfare.
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